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Entry and Competition in Takeover Auctions I
Matthew Gentry1,∗, Caleb Stroup2
Abstract
We estimate the degree of uncertainty faced by potential bidders in takeover
auctions and quantify how it affects prices in auctions and negotiations. The
high degree of uncertainty revealed by our structural estimation encourages
entry in auctions but reduces a target’s bargaining power in negotiations. In
the aggregate, auctions and negotiations produce similar prices, even though
auctions are preferred in takeover markets with high uncertainty, while the
reverse is true for negotiations. Firm characteristics predict pre-entry uncer-
tainty and thus are informative about the relative performance of auctions
and negotiations for individual targets.
Keywords:
Mergers and acquisitions, Auctions, Structural estimation, Negotiations,
Takeovers, Information frictions
JEL: G34, D44
1. Introduction
The corporate control market is one of the world’s largest, with more
than ten thousand U.S. companies sold in 2015, totaling $2.47 trillion in
deal value. Yet scholars remain divided about how companies should be sold
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to maximize sale prices for target shareholders. This disagreement exists
because the channels that determine competition in auctions and negotiations
are not well-understood.
A commonly held view, originally formalized by Bulow and Klemperer
(1996), is that direct competition among bidders generates high auction
prices. For example, Wasserstein (2000) reports that “A wide-ranging auc-
tion generally maximizes value . . . sophisticated bidders will do their best
to circumvent the auction format.” Many companies prefer to sell via auction
and acquire via negotiation (Auction Process Roundtable, Mergers and Ac-
quisitions, December 2006, pp. 31-32). Given this perspective, it may seem
puzzling that about half of companies are sold via single-bidder negotiations.
A different view, based on information frictions, suggests that negotia-
tions outperform auctions. Some scholars have suggested that invited po-
tential bidders face uncertainty about their values for a target and decline
when invited to participate in a takeover competition. In this view, absence
of potential competitors from the pool of entering bidders weakens direct
competition in auctions (e.g., French and McCormick, 1984; Boone and Mul-
herin, 2007). Recent research has also suggested that negotiated transactions
might even benefit from information frictions if a negotiating bidder with an
informational advantage shades up its offer price to deter potential competi-
tors (e.g., Fishman, 1988; Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll, 2010; Dimopoulos and
Sacchetto, 2014).
Yet information frictions in takeover markets are not directly observable,
a fact that has prevented researchers from quantifying the channels that de-
termine the relative performance of auctions and negotiations. Faced with
these difficulties, one might be tempted to simply compare observed rev-
enue resulting from auctions with those arising from negotiated transactions.
Such an approach might have the potential to yield insights about how firms
are sold, but not about how firms should be sold, in part because the rel-
ative optimality of auctions critically depends on the endogenous size and
composition of the pool of entering bidders.
We build and estimate a structural empirical framework that enables
recovery of the deep takeover market characteristics that determine the per-
formance of auctions and negotiations. Our point of departure is a takeover
auction framework in which entering bidders compete for a target by offering
successively higher prices until the winning bid is discovered. The key mod-
ification we introduce is that invited potential bidders endogenously choose
whether to participate based on imperfect information about their heteroge-
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neous values for the target. As we will show, in this framework the degree
of information frictions plays an empirically important role in determining
whether auctions or negotiations produce higher prices for target sharehold-
ers.
Our structural identification strategy relies on a fact, well-known in the
econometrics literature, that inferences about information frictions and other
takeover market primitives can be recovered from data on bids and entry pat-
terns, which we hand-collect from takeover filings submitted to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC). The main insight behind this strategy
is that pre-entry uncertainty affects the endogenous entry patterns that in
turn determine the competitiveness of the entering bidder pool in takeover
auctions (e.g., Roberts and Sweeting, 2013; Gentry and Li, 2014). Uncer-
tainty weakens the link between invited bidders’ heterogeneous ex post values
and their pre-entry beliefs, thus affecting entry decisions that determine the
equilibrium size and composition of the entering bidder pool. The relative
magnitudes of the channels through which pre-entry uncertainty affects the
competitiveness of the entering bidder pool depend on the magnitudes of the
takeover market primitives we study, hence the need to discipline the model
via structural estimation.
As a comparison with auctions, we focus on two negotiation procedures,
each of whose performance is determined by the takeover market characteris-
tics recovered by our structural estimation. These negotiation procedures are
realistic, easy to implement, and have been studied widely in the finance and
economics literatures (e.g., Fishman, 1988; Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Povel
and Singh, 2006; Horner and Sahuguet, 2007; Bulow and Klemperer, 2009).3
The first is the sequential negotiation, in which a target can successively ne-
gotiate with individual bidders until it reaches an adequate price. The second
is a one-shot negotiation followed by an auction-style market-check (i.e., a
“go-shop”).
We use the structural estimates to quantify three channels through which
uncertainty affects the relative performance of auctions and negotiations.
First, the composition effect in auctions refers to degradation in the quality
of the entering bidder pool that arises when pre-entry uncertainty lowers par-
3While one could certainly imagine hypothetical complex negotiation procedures, our
goal is to analyze negotiation procedures that are realistic and can be easily implemented
without the target or its investment bank having specific knowledge about potential bid-
ders’ values or beliefs, the degree of pre-entry uncertainty, or the average costs of entry.
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ticipation rates among relatively high-value potential entrants. This channel
captures the intuition that information frictions discourage entry, potentially
impairing takeover auction performance. Second, the size effect in auctions
refers to the fact that pre-entry uncertainty can encourage entry overall. This
effect exists because absence of high-value bidders from the pool of entrants,
just described, raises prospects for all potential entrants, thus encouraging
entry overall. Ignoring the size effect, or presuming its magnitude to be
small relative to the composition effect, leads to the belief that information
frictions necessarily impair auction performance. Yet whether the size or
composition effect dominates is an empirical question. The third channel,
at work in negotiated transactions, is the deterrence effect, which refers to
the possibility that a standing negotiating bidder shades up its offer price to
deter potential competitors. The sign and magnitude of the deterrence effect
is theoretically ambiguous, since an increase in uncertainty could in princi-
ple either strengthen or weaken a negotiating bidder’s incentive to shade up
its offer price.4 The relative performance of auctions and negotiations thus
depends on the signs and relative magnitudes of the size, composition, and
deterrence effects, which we jointly quantify using the structural estimates.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that takeover competi-
tions are characterized by endogenous entry, with fewer than half of invited
bidders choosing to participate in takeover auctions. Second, information
frictions in takeover markets are large, with potential bidders’ pre-entry be-
liefs about their values containing more noise than information.
Third, we show that pre-entry uncertainty varies across takeover markets.
Some takeover markets are characterized by nearly complete pre-entry uncer-
tainty, while in others potential bidders have relatively precise information.
We show that variation in pre-entry uncertainty is associated with the target
observables. For example, pre-entry uncertainty rises with target size and
leverage, falls with q-ratio (market-to-book) and cash holdings, while being
U-shaped in the sales-to-asset ratio.
Fourth, we show that auctions and negotiations perform similarly overall,
with sequential negotiations generating revenue about 1.13 percentage points
higher than auctions, a figure corresponding to about $10 million for a typical
4Conceptually, though pre-entry uncertainty unambiguously reduces the marginal effec-
tiveness of upward bid shading, it is not obvious that this impairs negotiation performance
in equilibrium since reduced marginal effectiveness could cause a bidder to shade its offer
up even higher if the incentive to deter entry is strong.
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target in our sample.
Fifth, we show that the aggregate similarity in the relative performance
of auctions and negotiations masks heterogeneity arising from differences
across targets in the degree of potential bidders’ pre-entry uncertainty. We
show empirically how differences across targets in the relative performance of
auctions and negotiations depends on the size, composition, and deterrence
effects in our sample. For example, our estimates reveal that the composi-
tion effect is small relative to the size effect, a fact implying that pre-entry
uncertainty raises expected revenue in auctions by encouraging entry overall,
even while degrading the composition of the entering bidder pool. This find-
ing implies that takeover auctions counterintuitively benefit when potential
bidders know less about their values, a result that stands in stark contrast to
studies overlooking the size effect. We also show how pre-entry uncertainty
affects target bargaining power in negotiations. Our estimates reveal that
deterrence bidding accounts for about 13 percentage points of deal premia
for a typical target in our sample. Pre-entry uncertainty weakens deterrence
bidding, thus reducing takeover revenue in negotiations.
Taken together, these findings imply that auctions tend to produce higher
prices in takeover markets with high pre-entry uncertainty, while the reverse
is true for negotiations. Quantitatively, the difference in expected revenue
between auctions and negotiations is about a percentage point for takeover
markets with pre-entry uncertainty at the 25th percentile of the distribution.
We show that the relative performance of auctions and negotiations varies
systematically with target-level observables and find, for example, that large,
highly leveraged targets that hold less cash are associated with more pre-
entry uncertainty, thus tending to prefer auctions over negotiations.
This paper contributes to several literatures. First, we contribute to
the literature attempting to quantify information frictions faced by poten-
tial bidders in takeover markets. Several studies have theoretically proposed
the types of frictions we study (e.g., French and McCormick, 1984; Povel
and Singh, 2006), or have inferred their possible existence from regressions
involving proxies of information frictions (e.g., Boone and Mulherin, 2007;
Rousseau and Stroup, 2015). Ours is the first to directly estimate pre-entry
uncertainty faced by potential bidders in takeover markets and to show that
takeover auctions can counterintuitively benefit from large information fric-
tions, while the opposite is true for negotiations.
We also contribute to the growing literature that studies the channels
that affect the relative performance of auctions and negotiations (e.g., Bet-
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ton and Eckbo, 2000; Povel and Singh, 2006; Horner and Sahuguet, 2007;
Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll, 2010). Some studies have theoretically examined
the channels studied here or have provided indirect evidence for their pos-
sible existence, but without providing a direct comparison of their relative
magnitudes (e.g., Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll, 2010). Our study is the first to
empirically quantify the size, composition, and deterrence effects in takeover
markets. By doing so, ours is thus the first study to empirically quantify the
channels through which information frictions affect takeover markets and to
use these to identify situations in which auctions or negotiations are more
likely to produce higher prices for target shareholders.
Finally, we contribute to the broader debate about whether targets should
be sold via auctions or negotiations. Specifically, assuming that potential
bidders have no pre-entry information, Bulow and Klemperer (2009) show
theoretically that formal auctions yield higher sale prices than do sequential
negotiations. Viewed in light of their result, the widespread use of negotia-
tions in practice could be viewed as a corporate governance failure. On the
other hand, Roberts and Sweeting (2013) theoretically show that this auction
dominance result hinges on the knife-edge assumption that potential bidders
are completely uninformed about their values prior to entry. Whether uncer-
tainty is sufficiently low to reverse auction dominance for some targets is an
empirical question. Our estimates provide the first such evidence, showing
that in many takeover environments sequential negotiations can in fact yield
higher revenue than auctions. Importantly, our comparisons feature a level
playing field between auctions and negotiations in the sense that for each
target we use a single set of estimated takeover market primitives, thus per-
mitting a comparison that mirrors corporate directors’ decision to sell their
company via either an auction or a negotiation.
Our paper is methodologically similar to two prior studies. In a structural
auction framework, Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) recover takeover market
unobservables using hand-collected data drawn from proxy statements sub-
mitted to the SEC. They take as given the size and composition of the enter-
ing bidder pool and explore possible valuation differences between strategic
and financial bidders. Our focus is instead on the overall entry patterns
that affect the relative ability of auctions to produce high prices for target
shareholders. Roberts and Sweeting (2013) develop a framework permitting
recovery of takeover market primitives when entry is endogenous and use it
to recover primitives that characterize government timber auctions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background on
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takeover auctions. Section 3 develops the empirical framework. Section 4 de-
scribes the data and reports summary statistics. Section 5 recovers takeover
market features. Section 6 analyzes the effects of information frictions on
auctions and negotiations. Section 7 reports robustness checks. Section 8
concludes.
2. Institutional background
This section describes a typical takeover auction, focusing on aspects
specific to the present study (see also Hansen, 2001).
A target board desiring an auction recruits a sell-side advisor to identify
and individually contact potential acquirers, inviting them to participate in
competitive bidding. Entry into the sale process occurs when a potential
bidder signs a confidentiality agreement restricting dissemination of nonpub-
lic information about the target’s finances and operations. The provision of
nonpublic information allows a bidder to discover its own value of the tar-
get, since nonpublic information about the target’s finances, operations, and
business prospects allows a bidder to assess possible asset complementarities
and integration costs specific to possible combination of the two firms’ oper-
ations. A potential bidder’s value is thus pair-specific and possibly uncertain
prior to entry.
These costly activities conducted by entrants are undertaken by the bid-
der’s management, in-house deal team, financial advisor, and legal advisor,
and focus on the discovery and assessment of nonpublic information permit-
ting an assessment of the bidder’s value for the target, i.e., asset comple-
mentarities and post-merger integration costs specific to a particular busi-
ness combination. Discovery activities typically include analyses of supply
chains, software and machine technology, research and development overlap,
intellectual property, marketing programs, potential technology transfer, re-
tiree pension and medical benefits, debt covenants, customer perceptions of
the target and potential acquirer, compatibility of corporate cultures and
other human resources, and the strategic reactions of competitors, among
others. Entry into takeover auctions is thus costly, not only because of direct
pecuniary costs and advisor fees, but also because of non-pecuniary costs
associated with forgone acquisition opportunities during the time when ne-
gotiations are ongoing, because of reputation risk if negotiations fail, because
of potential revelation of proprietary information if a competing bidder wins
the takeover competition, and because the bidder’s management, board, and
7
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
deal team expend time that could otherwise be used for other productive
projects.
Confidentiality agreements prevent bidders from revealing to other parties
the fact that the target is for sale, their presence in the takeover auction,
or their bids (e.g., Kirman, 2008). Potential bidders thus decide whether
to participate, and what bids to offer, without access to specific knowledge
about entry decisions or bids offered by other potential acquirers. In practice,
the target provides entering bidders with feedback about the “adequacy” of
their bids, and in some cases provides guidance about ranges of offers that
will be considered seriously.5
After entry, takeover auctions proceed by multiple bidding rounds, with
bidders raising their offers or dropping out after receiving unfavorable feed-
back from the target. In doing so, the target responds to bids by indicating
bid adequacy, with this process repeating until the bidder with the highest
value remains. If the highest offer price is above the target board’s reser-
vation value, the deal is announced publicly. This bidding structure most
closely resembles an ascending auction in which bidders successively drop
out until the highest bidder remains (e.g., Subramanian, 2011 p. 59).
3. Baseline Model Specification
3.1. Information and entry
A takeover auction of a target j is initiated when Nj potential bidders
i = {1, ..., J} are invited to participate in competitive bidding. Each of these
Nj invited potential bidders decides whether to participate in the takeover
auction. Potential bidders formally enter by signing confidentiality agree-
ments with the target, at which point each entering bidder conducts due
diligence on the target at cost Cj (e.g., Fishman, 1988; Hansen, 2001). The
nj entering bidders next engage in competitive bidding for the target, with
5The fact that neither potential bidders’ participation decisions nor offered bids are
generally disclosed simplifies our analysis of entry and bidding, since in takeover auctions
it eliminates confounding signaling or timing effects that would otherwise arise if entry de-
cisions were concurrently observed by other potential entrants (e.g., Rosenbaum and Pearl,
2009). Such issues would be of much greater concern for studies attempting to recover
takeover market primitives from data on takeover negotiations, which are less structured,
with many economically relevant features being unobservable to an econometrician.
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bidding based on values discovered during due diligence. Entering bidders
compete in a standard ascending auction. In such an environment, the dom-
inant strategy of an entrant with value realization Vij is to continue bidding
until the current posted price reaches Vij, and to exit when the target indi-
cates that a bid bj > Vij is adequate (e.g., Subramanian, 2011 p. 59). As
a robustness check, we estimated an alternate bidding model and obtained
similar results (Section 7, below). If the target’s reservation price exceeds
even the final bidder’s value, the auction concludes with no sale. Other-
wise, bidding continues until the purchase price reaches the maximum of
the second-highest entrant value and the target’s reservation price, at which
point competitive bidding concludes.
Let Vij denote potential bidder’s i’s ex ante unknown value of target j,
discovered after entry. Values depend both on a common observable stan-
dalone component (Mj) and an idiosyncratic asset complementarity net of
integration costs (νij) specific to a particular bidder-target pair. This formu-
lation follows the private-values literature on takeover auctions (e.g., Fish-
man, 1988; Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014).
Following Gorbenko and Malenko (2014), we specify the unconditional
distribution of values Vij among potential bidders as:
Vij = Mj exp{νij}, (1)
where idiosyncratic bidder-target complementarities νit are drawn indepen-
dently from a normal distribution with sale-specific mean µj and variance
σ2vj. The sale-specific mean µj allows for correlation among values while het-
erogeneity in νij reflects the fact that bidders differ in many dimensions (e.g.,
industrial or product market similarity to the target) that determine their
pair-specific asset complementarities and integration costs.
Prior to entry, each bidder i observes a private signal Sij of its (unknown
ex ante) value Vij, which informs its entry decision. This signal Sij is related
to the value Vij as follows:
Sij = Vij exp{εij}, (2)
where the error εij is Gaussian white noise with variance σ
2
εj. Since monotone
transformations of a signal preserve information, the marginal distribution
of Sij is irrelevant; all that matters is the dependence between Vij and Sij.
This result is important because it implies any normalization for Sij generates
identical empirical results if the copula between Vij and Sij is preserved. Let
9
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αj denote the average degree of potential bidders’ ex ante uncertainty about
their values, parameterized by the following noise-to-signal ratio:
αj ≡ σ2εj/(σ2vj + σ2εj) ∈ [0, 1]. (3)
Conditional on observing signal Sij = s prior to entry, invited bidder i there-
fore expects to draw a final (normalized) value Vij from the log-normal dis-
tribution
Vij/Mj ∼ Log-Normal(αjµj + (1− αj) ln s, αjσ2vj). (4)
Note that αj close to zero indicates that pre-entry signals are relatively infor-
mative, while αj close to one indicates that pre-entry signals are uninforma-
tive. As we will show, this noise-to-signal ratio αj turns out to be a critical
determinant both of the absolute revenue raised through takeover auctions
and of the relative revenue ranking of auctions versus negotiations.6
The target is endowed with a private reservation value V0j, drawn from
the ex ante distribution of potential acquirer values: i.e., V0j = Mj exp(ν0j)
with ν0j ∼ N(µj, σj). This specification reflects both management’s own
assessment of the target’s stand alone prospects and the fact that the tar-
get could always negotiate with a randomly selected potential bidder as an
alternative to the current takeover competition. As a robustness check, we
directly estimated the target’s reservation value distribution and obtained
similar results (Section 7, below).
Let cj = Cj/Mj denote the entry cost Cj as a fraction of target j’s
standalone value Mj. Since both Cj and cj are indexed by a specific target,
this normalization is without loss of generality. Taking observables Mj and
Nj as given, the takeover environment for target j is summarized by the
vector θj ≡ (µj, σνj, cj, αj).
6Conventional studies of auctions with endogenous entry have focused on two knife-
edge cases. In the first, originally developed by Samuelson (1985), invited potential bidders
have perfect knowledge about their own valuations. In the second, originally developed
by Levin and Smith (1994), invited potential bidders have no knowledge about their own
valuations. These polar assumptions have been traditionally used because they simplify
auction theory. These knife-edge assumptions are problematic for the empirical study
of takeover market performance because as we will show the average degree of pre-entry
uncertainty influences endogenous entry patterns in auctions and deterrence bidding in
negotiations.
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3.2. Equilibrium
As described above, bidding strategies in the takeover auction itself are
straightforward: conditional on entry, bids are linked with values through
the bidding equilibrium. In what follows, we therefore focus on character-
izing the entry equilibrium and the distribution of entering-bidder values,
which determine the distribution of bids. This section describes key qual-
itative features of equilibrium entry behavior, aiming to build intuition for
the subsequent analysis. A formal treatment of equilibrium is provided in
Appendix A.
In any symmetric monotone Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the entry stage
involves a threshold such that each invited bidder i enters if its signal sij
is above s∗j . This threshold s
∗
j is determined endogenously by the condition
that each potential bidder enters if expected post-entry profit is positive.
To see how s∗j is determined, consider a potential entrant with signal
realization sij facing Nj − 1 potential rivals k 6= i who enter when Skj ≥ s∗j .
If potential entrant i chooses to enter, it incurs the entry cost cj, learns its
value vij, and bids, winning the auction if vij exceeds both the seller’s reserve
and the maximum value among entering rivals, paying a price pj equal to the
maximum among these in this event.
Conditional on entry, bidder i with signal sij expects to draw its value
from the conditional distribution F (v|sij, θj). Meanwhile, for each rival k 6= i,
i’s expectations encompass two possibilities: either Skj < s
∗
j and bidder k
remains out, or Skj ≥ s∗j and bidder k enters. In the latter case, i expects k to
draw values from the distribution F (v|Skj ≥ s∗j): i.e., the selected distribution
of values among equilibrium entrants.
Now we return to the entry decision of potential entrant i. As we show
formally in Appendix A, the expected post-entry profit of a potential bidder
with signal realization sij is increasing in sij, increasing in s
∗
k 6=j, and decreas-
ing in Nj. In other words, all else equal, potential entrants prefer higher
expected values (higher sij), less aggressive rival entry (higher s
∗
k 6=j), and less
potential competition (lower Nj). For any competition level Nj and target
characteristics θj, there is therefore a unique signal threshold s
∗
j such that
a potential entrant drawing signal realization Sij = s
∗
j earns expected post-
entry profit equal to its entry costs cj. This zero-profit condition yields the
threshold s∗j characterizing entry in symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Holding all else constant, the entry threshold s∗j will be increasing in
both Nj and cj: facing either more potential competition or larger entry
11
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costs, potential bidders will require more positive pre-entry information in
order to enter. Since greater dispersion of post-entry values implies greater
expected profit, and in view of our log-normal specification the variance of
Vij is increasing in both µj and σνj, s
∗
j will generally be increasing in both µj
and σνj. Finally, reducing αj will lead all potential entrants to place more
credence on their pre-entry signals, which in particular will lead the marginal
entrant (i.e., the potential bidder with Sij = s
∗
j) to believe more strongly
that it will draw a relatively low value conditional upon entry. Hence, all
else equal, higher αj (more uncertainty) will also tend to increase entry,
though the magnitude of this effect depends on the full vector of fundamental
parameters.
From the target’s perspective, however, the comparative statics of the
auction process are far less clear: both expected takeover revenue and the
attractiveness of auctions relative to negotiations will depend critically, and
not necessarily uniformly, on the specifics of an individual takeover auction.
For instance, by more closely aligning potential bidders’ pre-entry signals
with their post-entry values, more precise pre-entry information (lower αj)
will increase the degree to which bidders with disproportionately high val-
ues self-select into entry. But it will also (as seen above) increase the entry
threshold s∗j and therefore lead to less entry overall. It is an empirical ques-
tion which of these effects dominates, depending on both Nj and the entire
vector of model primitives θj through the equilibrium threshold s
∗
j . Simi-
larly, as we show below, whether formal auctions or negotiations dominate
for a given target will depend on the entire vector of primitives θj. Theory
alone does not specify which combination of model parameters best describes
takeover markets, hence the need to discipline the model with the empirical
estimates.
3.3. Identification
This section provides a conceptual overview of how primitives of the
takeover environment are identified. For simplicity’s sake, we first consider
identification within a sample of targets with similar characteristics θj. We
then proceed to discuss complications induced by target-level heterogene-
ity. A more formal treatment of both issues can be found in Gentry and Li
12
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(2014).7
The first insight, which is common to structural auction models such
as Gorbenko and Malenko (2014), is that the distribution of bidder values
can be recovered from observed bids. In the context of the endogenous entry
model we consider here, this implies identification of the distribution of values
among bidders electing to enter given θj and Nj; i.e., F (v|Skj ≥ s∗j) in the
notation above. Within the specific parameterization we consider here, this
distribution F (v|Skj ≥ s∗j) is determined by the parameters (µj, σvj) of the
ex ante value distribution F0(·), the parameter αj governing precision of
pre-entry information, and the equilibrium signal threshold s∗j above which
invited bidders elect to enter.
The second insight is that as expected post-entry profits fall, fewer invited
potential bidders elect to enter. For a given level of potential competition Nj
and fundamental parameters θj, the fraction of invited bidders who choose
to enter will identify the equilibrium probability of entry 1 − Fs(s∗j). This
disciplines model parameters in two important respects. First, given µj,
σvj, and αj, the fraction of invited bidders choosing to participate is directly
informative about entry costs cj, since potential bidders choose to participate
only when the expected payoff net of participation costs is positive. Second,
as shown above, the equilibrium entry threshold s∗j will be increasing in both
cj and the number of invited bidders Nj since potential bidders expecting
higher costs or more competitors will require more favorable private signals
in order to participate. Hence, all else equal, more invited bidders (higher
Nj) will induce more selected distributions of values among entrants.
The third insight is that the degree to which the selected entrant value
distribution F (v|Skj ≥ s∗j) changes with s∗j is directly informative about the
noise-to-signal ratio αj. To see why, recall that as expected post-entry profits
fall and s∗j rises, fewer potential bidders choose to enter, but those that do
enter have higher values on average (F (v|Skj ≥ s∗j) is increasing in s∗j). In-
tuitively, higher pre-entry beliefs sij are required to rationalize entry. When
α is small, the sij primarily reflect information about values, and relatively
7Gentry and Li (2014) study nonparametric identification in a general class of selective
entry auctions nesting the ascending auction considered here. They formally show how the
parameters characterizing endogenous entry patterns, for example, pre-entry uncertainty,
can be recovered from a structural model based on observed variation in entry patterns
and winning bids. They then verify that identification extends to the case of auction-level
unobserved cross-sectional differences across targets.
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high-value potential bidders disproportionately elect to participate, implying
a steep gradient of F (v|Skj ≥ s∗j) in s∗j . In a world of high pre-entry un-
certainty, the sij are noisy and entry patterns become less tightly associated
with values, implying a relatively flat gradient of F (v|Skj ≥ s∗j) in s∗j . Since
the degree to which the selected entrant value distribution F (v|Skj ≥ s∗j)
changes with s∗j is directly informative about the noise-to-signal ratio αj,
comparing changes in F (v|Skj ≥ s∗j) across targets with different numbers
of invited bidders Nj pins down αj. In turn, having determined αj, knowl-
edge of F (v|Skj ≥ s∗j) for any entry probability 1−Fs(s∗j) uniquely identifies
F0j(·) and hence its parameters (µj, σvj).8 Thus, recovery of the distributions
that characterize the composition of the invited and entering bidder pools,
along with direct observation of their sizes in our data set, permits sharp
identification of the average degree of pre-entry uncertainty.
As we describe in detail below, our econometric implementation accom-
modates heterogeneity across targets in ways that are observable to market
participants but unobservable to the econometrician. In this case, formal
identification is more involved, as observed outcomes potentially arise from
unobserved mixtures across θj. Nevertheless, the intuition of the argument
follows closely from the discussion above: All else equal, the distribution
of transaction prices will be informative about the distributions of µj and
σj, average entry frequencies will be informative about the distribution of
entry costs cj, and changes in prices across otherwise similar targets with
different numbers of invited bidders Nj will be informative about αj. In
our structural implementation, we analyze all of these effects jointly within
8Formally, this is implied by the following identity, which follows from Equation A.6 in
Appendix A:
F (v|Skj ≥ s∗j ) =
F0j(v)− Fvs,j(v, s∗j )
1− Fsj(s∗j )
=
F0j(v)− Cαj (F0j(v), Fsj(s∗j ))
1− Fsj(s∗j )
,
where Cαj is the copula describing dependence between pre-entry signals Sij and post-
entry valuations Vij . Given our parametric assumptions above, one can show that Cαj is
a bivariate Gaussian copula with covariance parameter 1/αj . Knowledge of αj therefore
determines Cαj , from which identification of both F (v|Skj ≥ s∗j ) and Fsj(s∗j ) implies iden-
tification of F0j(v). Note that given a sufficiently large sample of targets with similar θj ,
we may apply this argument without parametric assumptions on the marginal distribution
F0j of Vij , from which it follows that parameterization of the copula alone is sufficient for
identification.
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a conditional maximum likelihood framework, allowing all underlying model
parameters to affect all observed outcomes including, for example, the frac-
tion of invited bidders who participate, the cross-sectional distribution of the
number of entrants, and the distribution of bids. Combined with a parame-
terization described below, this in turn permits recovery of the distribution
of target-level primitives θj across targets in our sample.
3.4. Estimation Strategy
Let pj denote the realized revenue from sale of target j, defined as the
sale price normalized by the target’s market value four weeks prior to sale
announcement. As above, let Nj and nj denote the number of invited
and participating bidders, respectively, in target j’s sale process. Con-
ditional on the number of invited bidders Nj and target-level primitives
θj = (µj, σνj, αj, cj), target-level outcomes (pj, nj) are determined endoge-
nously through the formal entry and bidding process described in Sections
3.1 and 3.2.
Let Xj denote a vector of target-level characteristics potentially influ-
encing target sale-level primitives θj. Elements of Xj include the target’s
industry, book value of total assets (current assets plus net property, plant,
and equipment plus other noncurrent assets), market leverage, q-ratio, along
with cash, intangibles, and sales, with these latter three variables scaled rel-
ative to book assets.
While targets clearly differ along many elements of Xj, takeover environ-
ments may also differ in other dimensions not observed by the researcher.
To accommodate this, we allow target-level primitives θj = (µj, σνj, αj, cj)
to vary across takeover markets based on both target-level observables and
factors unobserved by the econometrician. Specifically, we assume that the
distribution of primitives θj conditional on observables Xj is governed by a
distribution θj ∼ g(θj|Xj,Γ), where Γ is a vector of structural parameters to
be estimated. We specify this distribution g(θj|Xj,Γ) as follows:
µj ∼ Normal(mean = γµXj, var = σ2µ) (5)
σvj − τ ∼ Gamma(mean = exp(γσXj), shape = σσ)
cj ∼ Gamma(mean = exp(γcXj), shape = σc)
αj ∼ Beta(mean = exp(γαXj)/ (1 + exp(γcXj)) , var = σ2α)
where Gamma (mean = µ, shape = σ) denotes a Gamma distribution param-
eterized to have mean µ and shape parameter σ, Beta (mean = µ, var = σ2)
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denotes a Beta distribution parameterized to have mean µ and variance σ2,
and τ > 0 is a regularization constant which ensures that the variance pa-
rameter σ2vj is bounded away from zero.
9 The elements of θj are independent
conditional on Xj (i.e., the errors are independent).
Our goal is to use target-level outcomes (pj, nj, Nj) to conduct inference
on the deep structural primitives Γ0 = {γµ, γσ, γc, γα;σ2µ, σ2σ, σ2c , σ2α} charac-
terizing the distribution of θj|Xj. Toward this end, first note that the sample
of observed takeovers is a selected sample by construction, since auctions not
resulting in sale are not reported to the SEC and are thus not observable.
To account for this fact, we therefore consider estimation of Γ0 based on
conditional maximum likelihood with respect to the following event: nj bid-
ders enter and the final sale price is pj, conditional on the target contacting
Nj potential bidders and the auction resulting in sale. We construct the
conditional likelihood function corresponding to this event as follows.
Let salej be an indicator taking a value of one if an auction results in
sale. Taking θj and Nj as given, let Pr(nj|Nj; θj) be the probability that nj
of Nj invited potential bidders ultimately enter, let Pr(salej|nj, Nj, θj) be
the probability that the auction of target j leads to an announced sale, given
entry by nj of Nj invited potential bidders, and let fp(pj|salej, nj, Nj; θj) be
the density of the final price pj, given entry by nj of Nj potential bidders
and that the auction results in an announced sale. Integrating over the
target-level unobservables θj, we may then express the predicted likelihood
of observing pj, nj conditional on Nj, Xj, and salej = 1 in terms of the
unknown parameter vector Γ as follows:
Lj(pj, nj|salej = 1, Nj, Xj; Γ) =∫
fp(pj|salej, nj, Nj; θj) · Pr(salej|nj, Nj; θj) · Pr(nj|Nj; θj) g(θj|Xj,Γ) dθj/∫
Pr(salej|nj, Nj; θj) · Pr(nj|Nj; θj) g(θj|Xj,Γ) dθj. (6)
We evaluate this expression via simulation by first deriving predicted equilib-
rium values of fp(pj|salej, nj, Nj; θj), Pr(salej|nj, Nj; θj), and Pr(nj|Nj; θj)
for many possible values of θj from the theoretical entry and bidding model
above and then taking appropriate weighted averages over these to evaluate
9We also explore estimation under several alternative specifications, such as using trun-
cated log-normal distributions for the parameters σvj , cj , and αj , and find similar results.
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the integrals on the right-hand side of (6). We next maximize the (log of) the
resulting likelihood function over Γ to recover conditional maximum likeli-
hood estimates of the deep structural parameters Γ0. Appendix B describes
the computational details of this procedure.
3.5. Negotiation Formats
In this section, we formalize two commonly studied negotiation frame-
works, which we compare to the auction benchmark using the takeover mar-
ket primitives estimated using the structural procedure above. By conducting
counterfactual comparisons using a single set of takeover market primitives,
we circumvent the empirical challenge that transactions involving a single
bidder can take a variety of strategically differing forms that produce differ-
ent levels of expected revenue, but which are also observationally indistin-
guishable to an econometrician. Negotiation structures differ, for example,
in the extent of competitive pressure exerted by potential competition. Even
more troubling, a single-bidder sale observed in the data could reflect dif-
ferent negotiation structures, such as a successful one-shot negotiation or a
successful first stage in a sequential negotiation, among other possibilities.
The first negotiation format we consider is a sequential negotiation, vari-
ants of which have been studied extensively in the theoretical literatures
on takeovers and mechanism design (e.g., Fishman, 1988; Daniel and Hir-
shleifer, 2018; Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Povel and Singh, 2006; Horner and
Sahuguet, 2007; Bulow and Klemperer, 2009; Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll, 2010;
Dimopoulos and Sacchetto, 2014; Roberts and Sweeting, 2013). Relative to
the standard auction outlined above, this sequential negotiation differs in two
respects. First, rather than contacting all potential buyers at once, the target
negotiates with one standing bidder at a time and successively approaches
additional potential buyers in an attempt to obtain a higher price. Second,
a standing negotiating bidder has market power in the sense that it has an
informational advantage and can shade up its offer price to deter subsequent
rival entry.
This sequential negotiation procedure proceeds in N rounds, one round
for each potential buyer. Round n = 1, ..., N begins when the target ap-
proaches potential buyer i = 1, ..., N (ordered at random) with an invitation
to participate in a negotiation. The sequence of events in round n then
proceeds as follows:
17
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
1. Potential buyer i observes its private signal Sij for the target. Based
on this signal Sij and the entry and bidding history up to round n− 1,
potential bidder i determines whether to enter the negotiation at cost
c.
2. Conditional on choosing to enter, potential buyer i learns its value Vij.
If another negotiating bidder has previously entered, potential buyer
i and the current incumbent compete in an ascending button auction
for the right to remain in the auction. The loser of this bidding round
exits and the winner becomes the incumbent, with the current standing
price being the level at which the loser drops out.
3. Conditional on outbidding the current incumbent, potential buyer i
may submit a bid above the current standing price. If submitted, this
deterrence bid is observed by all subsequent potential buyers, and be-
comes the standing price in round n+ 1.
This sequential negotiation game corresponds to the game considered
by Bulow and Klemperer (2009) in all but one respect: Whereas Bulow
and Klemperer (2009) assume potential bidders have no private information
about their values prior to entry, our framework allows potential bidders to
observe partially informative pre-entry signals about their post-entry values.
As we will see, accounting for endogenous entry patterns in the presence of
such imperfect pre-entry information, most targets would in fact earn greater
revenue from sequential sales than they would from auctions. This finding
contrasts with Bulow and Klemperer (2009), who theoretically show that,
in their environment without pre-entry information, auctions yield higher
expected revenue than sequential negotiations.
The price in this sequential negotiation evolves as follows. Let bn−1 be
the standing bid at the beginning of round n, and yn−1 be the value of the
incumbent submitting bid bn−1. Suppose that i elects to enter in round n,
drawing value vij upon entry. Then, three outcomes are possible in round
n. If vij is less than the current standing bid bn−1, then i exits and the
negotiation proceeds to round n + 1 with standing bid bn = bn−1. If vij is
greater than bn−1 but less than yn−1, then i bids up the price to vij before
exiting, and the negotiation proceeds to round n+ 1 with standing bid bn =
vij. Finally, if vij is greater than yn−1, then the current incumbent bids up
the price to yn−1 before exiting, and i becomes the new incumbent. To signal
strength and thereby deter future entry, incumbent i may then submit a
deterrence bid bn ≥ yn−1. This deterrence bid bn then becomes the standing
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price in round n + 1. The standing bid at the start of Round 1 (i.e., b0) is
the target’s reservation valuation v0j.
We focus on the unique symmetric separating perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium within this sequential negotiation game. This equilibrium has two key
components. First, entry decisions by bidder i in round n = 1, ..., N are
described by a signal threshold s∗n(yn−1) such that potential buyer i enters
if and only if Sij ≥ s∗n(yn−1), where yn−1 denotes the value of the standing
bidder and s∗n(yn−1) is strictly increasing in yn−1. Second, conditional on
outbidding an incumbent with value yn−1 in round n < N , new incumbent
i with value vij ≥ yn−1 submits a deterrence bid bn ≥ yn−1 described by
a symmetric monotone deterrence bidding strategy βn(vij, yn−1). This de-
terrence bidding strategy βn(·, yn−1) embodies by the following trade-off: a
new incumbent can credibly signal a higher value (and thereby deter rival
entry) by submitting a higher deterrence bid, but must then pay a higher
price conditional on winning with this higher bid. As described in detail
in Appendix C, the resulting separating equilibrium exists, is unique, and
implies deterrence bidding strategies βn(·, yn−1) which, for round n < N and
any standing value yn−1, are strictly monotone in v for all v ≥ yn−1. Further-
more, as shown by Roberts and Sweeting (2013), this separating equilibrium
is the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium to survive standard refinements (no
weakly dominated strategies, sequential equilibrium, and the D1 refinements
of Cho and Sobel (1990) and Ramey (1996)) on equilibria of the underlying
sequential negotiation game.
The second negotiation procedure, formally described in Appendix C, is
a one-shot negotiation followed by a market check. This mechanism provides
a simple alternative to a formal takeover auction and captures the possibility
that a target may choose to conduct an auction-style process after concluding
negotiations with a potential buyer (e.g., Wasserstein, 2000; Subramanian,
2008; Wang, 2016). In this mechanism, the target approaches a potential
buyer with an invitation to participate in a negotiated sale. Based on its pre-
entry beliefs and the entry cost, the potential buyer determines whether to
participate in the negotiation. Conditional on choosing to enter, the potential
buyer learns its value and submits a bid for the target. If, after negotiations
between this bidder and the target conclude, the agreed-upon price is higher
than the target’s reservation value, then the bid is announced publicly and
other potential bidders are invited to enter and to make more competitive
bids for the target. Based on their own signals, the entry cost, and the
posted price, additional bidders choose whether to enter and furnish a bid.
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The bidder with the highest offer acquires the target.10
The equilibria in both negotiation structures described above capture the
well-known potential advantage of negotiations in which a standing bidder
has a first-mover advantage that allows it to deter potential competition by
elevating its offer price (e.g., Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll, 2010).11 We will
show that the strength of such deterrence bidding—and thus the target’s
realized bargaining power in negotiations—crucially depends on information
frictions in takeover markets, which determine the extent of an initial bidder’s
informational advantage over potential competitors (e.g., Povel and Singh,
2006).
4. Data and Summary Statistics
Our sample of takeovers comes from the Securities Data Corporation
(SDC) mergers and acquisitions (M&A) database, filtered by the following
criteria:
• The takeover was announced between January 1, 2000 and January 1,
2010;
• The winning bidder is publicly listed and obtains 100% of the target’s
shares as a result of the deal;
• Deal backgrounds are available on the SEC Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) online filing system;12
• The target is a publicly traded Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 com-
pany;
10For example, the proxy statement submitted by Disc Graphics to the SEC in con-
junction with its sale to Main Street Resources in December 2002 indicates that the sale
resulted from a nine-month negotiation between Disc Graphics and Main Street Resources,
followed by an auction in which the target’s investment bank invited 15 potential bidders
to participate in a post-signing market check.
11The separating equilibria have the feature that a standing bidder’s type can be inferred
from its jump bid.
12Deal backgrounds are contained in SC-TOT, 14D-9, PREM
14C, DEFM 14C, DEFS 14A, and S-4 filings, available at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html.
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• The deal is an auction,which we define as one having at least two invited
bidders;
• Financial data on the target are available from the S&P Compustat
database.
We also required data on the winning bid to be available in the Thomson
M&A database. As a robustness check, we estimated the model on a set of
bids manually recorded from press releases and found similar results. In our
context, possible misvaluation of reported stock bids would reflect measure-
ment error, captured by the heterogeneity distributions described in Section
3. For robustness we also estimated model parameters on the subsample of
winning cash bids and found similar results.
Target characteristics come from the Compustat database and include the
target’s industry, book value of total assets, market leverage, q-ratio, along
with cash, intangibles, and sales, with these latter three variables scaled
relative to book assets. We exclude observations for which the winning bid is
below the target’s share price or greater than 200% above the target’s share
price four weeks prior to announcement, or for which the target’s market
value is greater than $1 trillion.
Table 1 reports sale characteristics for the 529 auctions in our sample,
both for the entire sample (reported in the first row) and for each of the
12 Fama and French (1997) industries. The second two columns show that
limited participation is a pervasive feature of takeover markets. Only 44% of
invited potential bidders (on average, five out of 13) participate in takeover
auctions. There is some variation in limited participation across industries:
More than half of invited bidders participate in auctions of retail firms, while
fewer than a third participate in auctions of energy companies. The fourth
column shows that winning bids are on average higher in industries where
a greater fraction of invited bidders participate, consistent with our model
in which higher average potential bidder values lead to higher signals and
more entry. Standard deviations of these variables are reported in parenthe-
ses. Wide variation in entry patterns and winning bids, even within specific
industries, underscores our estimating approach is robust to the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity not captured by target-level observables.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) of
target characteristics. Targets in our sample are similar to average Compustat-
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listed and S&P 1500 firms.13
5. Characterizing takeover environments
Panel A of Table 3 reports the estimates obtained using the method out-
lined in Section 3. We begin by comparing specifications. The first two
columns report estimates obtained from different versions of the numerical
estimation procedure. The estimates in Column 1 are obtained using un-
informed simulation draws, while those in Column 2 use simulation draws
informed by the estimates in Column 1.14 The estimates are similar, with
some improvement gained from the additional iterations in Column 2.
The estimates in Columns 3 - 5 condition on the vector of target observ-
ables Xj, which includes target size, leverage, cash ratio, sales-to-asset ratio,
intangibles-to-asset ratio, market-to-book ratio, and indicator variables for
the 12 Fama-French industries. The vector of target observables enters the
distribution of µ in Column 3, the distributions of µ and α in Column 4,
and the distributions of µ, α, c , and σ in Column 5. The estimates of pre-
entry uncertainty and other fundamental takeover market characteristics are
similar across specifications, an expected finding given the fact that our iden-
tification strategy is based on information about endogenous entry patterns
and bids, rather than target characteristics (see Section 3.3). At the same
time, there is a possibility of overfitting the estimation with free parameters:
The estimates in Column 5, for example, add an additional 68 parameters
to the baseline specification. The appropriate specification test for covariate
inclusion in our context is the likelihood ratio (LR) comparison of restricted
versus unrestricted models. LR tests indicate that Column 4 is the appropri-
ate specification, i.e., that the distributions of µ and α should be conditioned
on target covariates.15
The main estimates of pre-entry uncertainty in Column 4 reveal that
potential bidders have imperfect information about their values for the target,
13See, for example, Panel A of Table 3 in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) for
Compustat firms and Table 2 in Rousseau and Stroup (2015) for S&P 1500 firms.
14See Appendix B for a detailed description of the estimating procedure.
15Specifically, we conduct LR tests of the model excluding observables against the al-
terative where they enter in the distribution of µ (LR statistic 58.6 with p-value 1.7e-06).
The null of observables entering µ is rejected against the alternative of observables entering
both µ and α (LR statistic 35.2 with p-value 0.006). The LR statistic fails to reject the
null of observables in µ and α against the alternative in which they enter all distributions
(LR statistic 21.5 with p-value 0.95).
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with pre-entry signals containing more noise than information (α = 0.58).
Likelihood ratio tests strongly reject the views that potential bidders are
perfectly informed or completely uninformed about their values for a target
(LR statistic 319.0 and p-value of 0.00 for α = 1 and LR statistic 1750.1
and p-value of 0.00 for α = 0). Entry costs, reported in the second row of
Column 4, average about one percent of deal value.
These findings have important implications for the understanding of takeover
markets: Together, imperfect pre-entry information and costly participation
cause potential bidders with unfavorable pre-entry beliefs to decline partic-
ipation, some of which would have discovered higher values for the target
had they chosen to participate. Thus, pre-entry uncertainty causes relatively
high-value potential buyers to be absent from the pool of participating bid-
ders, an effect we empirically quantify below in Section 6.2. At the same
time, the fact that pre-entry beliefs contain some information implies that
high-value potential entrants are still disproportionately represented in the
pool of entering bidders relative to the pool of potential bidders.
Panel B disaggregates the primitives and reveals significant variation
across takeover markets. The standard deviation of pre-entry uncertainty
is 0.13, and over a fourth of takeovers occur in environments where poten-
tial bidders’ pre-entry beliefs primarily reflect information (i.e., α < 0.4 at
the 25th percentile of the distribution). As we will show in Section 6 be-
low, pre-entry uncertainty systematically affects the relative performance of
auctions and negotiations, implying that the cross-sectional variation in pre-
entry uncertainty shown here results in differences across takeover markets
in the relative performance of auctions and negotiations.
Table 4 reports the partial effects associated with individual covariates in
the fundamental parameter distributions. In interpreting these, it is impor-
tant to recall how our parameters are identified. The structural parameters
in our framework are identified based on information about entry patterns
and bids, observable by the econometrician ex post, i.e., after a sale process
is completed. Yet our analysis also accounts for differences in takeover mar-
kets based on target-level characteristics (e.g., size) that can be observed ex
ante, i.e., before the beginning of a sale process. While it is true that these
observable target characteristics cannot by themselves identify our model,
they could turn out to be systematically associated with the takeover mar-
ket primitives recovered above. The partial effects in Table 4 quantify the
nature of this association. Note, however, that insofar as one is ultimately
interested in the overall associations between target observables and takeover
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prices, these marginal effects may be somewhat difficult to interpret, since
covariates may be correlated with each other, while also affecting multiple
fundamental parameters simultaneously.
To address these issues, we sort targets by 12 Fama-French industries and
compute average pre-entry uncertainty within each industry. The findings are
reported in Panel A of Table 5. Average pre-entry uncertainty ranges from
0.87 for nondurables to 0.35 in oil, gas, and coal. Panel A also reports 2.5
and 97.5 percentiles of the fundamental parameter distributions and reveals
substantial variation across targets, even within each Fama-French industry.
For example, potential bidders for a target at the 2.5th percentile in business
equipment have near-perfect pre-entry information (α = 0.08), in contrast
to potential bidders for a target at the 97.5th percentile who are on average
relatively uninformed (α = 0.75).
In Panel B of Table 5 we sort targets in our sample based on target size,
cash, leverage, q-ratio, and sales, then calculate average pre-entry uncer-
tainty implied by the structural model across targets within each quantile.
We would expect to observe less pre-entry uncertainty in sales of companies
with high cash ratios, since cash reflects a component of total assets that
is relatively less difficult to value. Panel B of Table 5 shows that pre-entry
uncertainty does indeed fall with target cash holdings at every size quantile,
averaging 0.72 among small, low-cash targets and 0.33 among large, high-cash
targets. Pre-entry uncertainty also rises with target leverage, for example,
from 0.39 to 0.62 for large targets. Pre-entry uncertainty is negatively associ-
ated with the q-ratio, for example, falling from 0.70 to 0.44 between the first
and fifth quantiles for medium-sized targets. Having shown that pre-entry
uncertainty varies in the cross-section of takeover markets, we now examine
how this variation affects the overall performance of takeover auctions and
negotiations for individual targets.
6. Comparing auctions and negotiations
6.1. Aggregate results
We now use the structural estimates to show how pre-entry uncertainty
and endogenous entry affect takeover revenue in auctions and negotiations.
This comparison is possible because the takeover market primitives recovered
by our structural estimation characterize expected revenue for each target
in both auctions and negotiations. The counterfactual comparisons are ob-
tained using the structural model described in Section 3 and the fundamental
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parameter estimates from Section 5.16
The first row of Table 6 reports expected revenue for each sale procedure,
aggregated across all takeovers. Average revenue is similar across auctions
(41.17%), sequential negotiations (42.61%), and negotiations followed by a
go-shop (41.48%). This finding has important implications for the under-
standing of how firms should be sold. Theoretical comparisons of auctions
and negotiations have suggested that direct competition among entering bid-
ders in auctions generates higher revenue for target shareholders than can be
obtained from negotiated transactions, a conclusion that has been used to
interpret the widespread prevalence of negotiations as reflecting managerial
capture of corporate takeover processes (e.g., Bulow and Klemperer, 1996,
2009).17 The belief that auctions always revenue-dominate negotiations would
imply support for more stringent interpretations of Delaware’s Revlon ruling,
originally construed as directing target boards to act as “auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders.”
The estimates also reveal two important sources of variation masked by
aggregate comparisons of auctions and negotiations. The first of these is
variation in realized revenue arising from unpredictable aspects of the sale
process. The second row of Table 6 reports wide variability in revenue for
a particular target, with the standard deviation of takeover auction revenue
equal to 11%. This high variability in outcomes points to the fact that the
pool of entering bidders is itself variable due to endogenous entry patterns in
the face of pre-entry uncertainty. Indeed, the bottom row of Table 6 shows
that the invited bidder with the highest value declines to participate in about
a quarter of takeover auctions.
Negotiations have greater return predictability than auctions, with rev-
enue standard deviation of 3% for sequential negotiations and 9% for nego-
tiations followed by a go-shop (row two of Table 6). At the same time, the
16Formally, estimates are obtained from the posterior revenue distribution for each of
the three sale mechanisms described above by drawing vectors (Xj , θj) from the prior like-
lihood and by using the structural environment defined in Section 3 and the fundamental
parameters obtained in Section 5 at median observable and unobservable characteristics,
setting µv to match observed revenue, ν0j = 1, and constructing expected revenue for each
sale procedure, then repeating this procedure 10,000 times.
17Another approach in this debate has been to compare observed revenue in transac-
tions structured as auctions with those structured as negotiations, but without tackling
econometric concerns addressed by our structural procedure.
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fourth row of Table 6 quantifies this effect and reveals that targets extract
more surplus in sequential negotiations than in auctions. These effects occur
because equilibrium bid shading in negotiations deters potential competi-
tors, leading to greater surplus extracted for targets, but less variability in
observed revenue. Consistent with this idea, the fifth row of Table 6 shows
that the potential bidder with the highest value is less likely to acquire a
target sold by a negotiation, relative to an auction. Taken along with the
fact that target boards may be reluctant to initiate relatively risky sale pro-
cesses, our finding that auction revenue is relatively unpredictable provides
a new explanation for the widespread prevalence of negotiated transactions
in corporate takeover markets.
The second source of variation is in the relative performance of auctions
and negotiations across takeover markets. We construct the distribution of
auction-negotiation revenue differences using the method described in Sec-
tion 3 and find that auction revenue is greater than negotiation revenue for
about a third of takeovers. The standard deviation of target-level revenue
differences is 1.7%, or about $39 million for a target at the 75th percentile
of the size distribution. Our work is thus the first to disaggregate the rel-
ative performance of auctions and negotiations in this way, showing that
either auctions or negotiations may be unambiguously preferable for a par-
ticular target, while at the same time both sale procedures perform similarly
on aggregate. We next quantify the specific channels that generate these
differences across individual takeover markets in our sample.
6.2. Information and the relative performance of auctions and negotiations
In this section, we quantify how pre-entry uncertainty affects the relative
performance of auctions and negotiations in the cross-section of takeover
markets. As we will see, pre-entry uncertainty operates through three com-
peting channels whose signs and relative magnitudes determine whether a
particular target in our sample would expect greater revenue by being sold
in an auction or in a negotiated transaction.
The first channel is the composition effect in takeover auctions, which
reflects the fact that some potential bidders decline to participate based on
initially unfavorable pre-entry beliefs, even though some would have discov-
ered high values had they chosen to participate in a takeover competition.
Such invited bidders rationally decline to participate based on information
available to them at the time, but their absence from the entering bidder pool
is suboptimal ex post and degrades competition in auctions, even if takeover
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markets are efficient in other respects.
Does the composition effect play a quantitatively important role in de-
termining takeover auction revenue? To answer this question, we define the
composition effect as the difference between the winning bid and the winning
bid that would have resulted had the distributions of potential and entering
bidder values been identical. Notice that the distribution of potential and
entering bidder values is identical only when potential bidders’ decisions to
enter are random. As we have shown, this occurs only in the limiting case
wherein bidders have no pre-entry information about their values (i.e., when
α = 1). Our structural estimates identify α = 0.58 as the typical case, so
in practice some high-value potential bidders decline to participate. Holding
constant the size of the entering bidder pool, the composition effect quantifies
this effect.
Fig. 1 uses the structural estimates from our sample of takeovers to
construct the probability of entry for different potential bidder types. The
vertical axis measures the probability that the potential bidder with the Pth
highest value enters, relative to an average potential bidder. When α = 0.3,
the top 10% of potential bidders are about 65% more likely to participate
than an average potential bidder. But for takeover markets with greater pre-
entry uncertainty, high-value potential bidders are less likely to participate.
In light of the composition effect, the high degree of pre-entry uncertainty
and limited participation, shown here, could be interpreted as direct evidence
that information frictions impair the performance of takeover auctions, as
suggested by some scholars.
The second channel through which endogenous entry affects takeover auc-
tions is the size effect. It refers to the fact that pre-entry uncertainty encour-
ages entry overall: Possible absence of high-value bidders, due to the compo-
sition effect, raises other potential bidders’ prospects conditional upon entry,
thus incentivizing their participation. But when takeover markets are char-
acterized by imperfect information, some entrants discover higher values for
the target upon entry, and their participation raises the overall competitive-
ness of the entering bidder pool. A larger pool of entering bidders can thus
contain more high-value bidders overall, even if a lower fraction of entrants
have relatively high values. Formally, we define the size effect for an auction
with n entering bidders as the effect of endogenous entry on expected rev-
enue, holding constant the composition of the entering bidder pool. This by
definition isolates the effect of pre-entry uncertainty on overall entry, since
it holds constant the relative probabilities with which high- and low-value
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potential bidders enter. By definition takeover revenue is equal to the sum
of the size and composition effects.
Fig. 2 empirically quantifies the size effect for targets in our sample using
the structural estimates obtained in Section 5. The vertical axis measures
the proportion of invited bidders that choose to participate. These estimates
reveal that the size effect is quantitatively important, with the average prob-
ability of entry for each potential bidder rising from 35% to 60% within the
25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution in pre-entry uncertainty (i.e.,
between α = 0.4 and α = 0.77).
The existence of the size effect, overlooked in previous research on takeover
auctions, raises the possibility that information frictions could lead to higher
takeover auction revenue if the size effect is quantitatively large relative to
the composition effect. Though the size effect is unambiguous in sign, theory
alone is uninformative about its magnitude, which depends on the full vec-
tor of estimated takeover market primitives through the entry equilibrium
described in Section 3.
In Table 7, we use the structural estimates to compute the relative con-
tribution of the size and composition effects to takeover auction revenue, for
various levels of pre-entry uncertainty and entry costs. Table 7 shows that the
composition effect—the negative effect of information frictions on the com-
position of the entering bidder pool—accounts for less than 10% of takeover
auction revenue. This quantitative dominance of the size effect implies that
takeover auctions are surprisingly resilient to the presence of information fric-
tions, and even benefit from them, a finding that stands in stark contrast to
studies that ignore the size effect, and which presume information frictions
always impair takeover auction performance.
The third channel through which pre-entry uncertainty affects the rela-
tive performance of auctions and negotiations is the deterrence effect, which
formalizes the idea that a negotiating bidder might shade up their offer price
to deter potential competition (e.g., Fishman, 1988; Aktas, de Bodt, and
Roll, 2010; Dimopoulos and Sacchetto, 2014). Formally, we quantify the de-
terrence effect in a sequential negotiation as the additional amount by which
the buyer’s bid exceeds the second-highest value among the set of bidders
that participated at any point in the negotiation sequence.
Does pre-entry uncertainty raise or lower a target’s bargaining power?
In other words, does pre-entry uncertainty lead to more or less aggressive
deterrence bidding? The answer to this question is theoretically ambiguous.
To see why, consider a standing bidder’s incentive to shade up its offer price.
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The marginal effectiveness of a slightly higher bid depends on the extent to
which it deters potential competition, which in turn depends on a potential
competitor’s decision to enter into negotiations if invited by the target. Pre-
entry uncertainty lowers a potential competitor’s sensitivity to an observed
increase in the posted price offered by a standing bidder, thus lowering the
marginal effectiveness of the deterrence bid. Yet, this could incentivize a
standing bidder to shade up their offer even higher to mitigate this reduced
effectiveness if the incentive to deter entry is strong. Whether this is the case
depends on the full vector of estimated takeover market primitives through
equilibrium in the sequential negotiation. It is thus an empirical question of
whether pre-entry uncertainty leads to lesser or greater deterrence bids.
In Fig. 3, we use the estimated takeover market primitives to quantify
the direction and strength of deterrence bidding as a function of variation
in pre-entry uncertainty. In a typical takeover negotiation with α = 0.58,
deterrence bidding accounts for about 13 percentage points of target revenue
(i.e., of deal premia). At the same time, takeovers with greater pre-entry
uncertainty are associated with weaker deterrence bidding, a finding imply-
ing that negotiations tend to perform better in takeover environments with
relatively low pre-entry uncertainty.
In Fig. 4, we use the structural estimates to jointly quantify these three
channels to show how variation in pre-entry uncertainty across takeover mar-
kets affects the relative performance of auctions and negotiations. To do this,
we compute the average expected revenue difference between sequential ne-
gotiations and auctions (solid line) and between go-shop negotiations and
auctions (dashed line) for different levels of pre-entry uncertainty, using the
takeover market primitives recovered from the structural estimation. The fig-
ure shows that auctions revenue-dominate negotiations when pre-entry uncer-
tainty is high, near the 75th percentile of pre-entry uncertainty across targets
in our sample (Table 3). Indeed, the majority of cross-sectional variation in
the relative performance of auctions and negotiations in our sample is ac-
counted for by information frictions operating through the size, composition,
and deterrence channels just described.18
The finding that auctions perform relatively well when pre-entry uncer-
18This result was obtained by regressing the target-specific sequential negotiation rev-
enue difference function on polynomials and interactions of the fundamental parameters.
We then compute the ratio of R-squares from regressions that omit and include the infor-
mational parameters αj and cj , which is 0.86.
29
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
tainty is high has important implications for the understanding of how firms
should be sold. First, having no knowledge about the size effect, some pre-
vious researchers studying corporate takeovers presumed that information
frictions unambiguously impair auction performance. Our structural esti-
mates reveal that the size effect is quantitatively more important than the
composition effect, implying that takeover auctions counterintuitively benefit
from pre-entry uncertainty. Second, though other studies have provided evi-
dence for the possible existence of the deterrence effect, it was not previously
known how potential competitors’ uncertainty affects a target’s bargaining
power in negotiations. Our structural estimates have shown that the positive
effect of deterrence bidding on negotiation performance is likely to be most
pronounced in takeover environments with low information frictions.
We also check to see how variation in entry costs interacts with the ef-
fect of pre-entry uncertainty. In Fig. 5, we use the structural estimates to
quantify the effect of entry costs and pre-entry uncertainty on the relative
performance of auctions and negotiations. In the figure, dark circles repre-
sent cases in which auctions produce higher prices, while hexagrams represent
cases where negotiations produce higher prices. Hollow circles indicate cases
in which simulation error exceeds estimated revenue differences. Consistent
with the results in Fig. 4, auctions perform relatively well when pre-entry
uncertainty is high, while Fig. 5 reveals that higher entry costs raise the
threshold level of pre-entry uncertainty at which auctions revenue-dominate
negotiations.
6.3 Target observables and the relative optimality of auctions and negotiations
Up to this point we have shown how, through the size, composition,
and deterrence effects, pre-entry uncertainty affects the relative performance
of auctions and negotiations. The findings reported in Table 5 reveal that
variation in pre-entry uncertainty across takeover markets is predictable by
observable target firm characteristics. In this section, we examine how the
relative performance of auctions and negotiations varies with target observ-
ables. To do this, we sort targets in our sample based on each characteristic
and use the estimated fundamental parameters to determine the expected
frequency with which each target expects to obtain relatively higher revenue
from holding an auction.
Panel A of Table 8 reports box plots showing how the relative performance
of auctions and negotiations varies across Fama-French industries. Variation
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in the relative performance of auctions and negotiations across industries is
consistent with variation in pre-entry uncertainty across industries, shown in
Section 5. For example, Panel A of Table 8 shows that the business equip-
ment sector has the lowest fraction of targets for which auctions outperform
negotiations, consistent with the low degree of pre-entry uncertainty in this
industry, shown in Table 5. Conversely, the estimates in Table 5 uncovered
high average pre-entry uncertainty among bidders for targets headquartered
in consumer durables and nondurables, and Panel A of Table 8 shows that
these industries have the highest proportion of targets for which auctions
outperform negotiations.
Turning to target financials, Panel B of Table 8 reports the fraction of
targets for which auctions are preferable, for the bottom and top quantiles of
targets in our sample. Auctions are more likely to be preferred when leverage
is high, cash holdings are low, and the q-ratio is high, consistent with the
associations between these characteristics and pre-entry uncertainty, shown
above.
Our findings about the relationship between target observables and the
relative performance of auctions and negotiations differ from earlier research
that did not account for endogenous entry and pre-entry uncertainty when
asking how a firm should be sold. For example, Fidrmuc et al. (2012) do not
find a relationship between q and targets’ propensities to sell via auction,
while our results show that pre-entry uncertainty falls with q, incentivizing
sale via a negotiated transaction. Another difference is our finding that pre-
entry uncertainty, and thus the relative performance of auctions, is positively
associated with target leverage, as should be expected given that higher
leverage can complicate a potential bidder’s task of valuing assets. With
respect to target size, Boone and Mulherin (2007) do not find a relationship
between target size and the relative market reaction to announced auctions
and negotiations. By focusing on winning bids and accounting for endogenous
entry, we show that larger targets more frequently prefer auctions.
Our analysis also differs from work attempting to recover insights about
optimal sale procedures based on ex post deal outcomes. For example, Boone
and Mulherin (2007) attempt to explain a target’s choice of sale mechanism
by whether the winning bidder paid in cash. But studies in the corporate fi-
nance literature have shown that method of payment depends on the winning
bidder’s characteristics (e.g., Travlos, 1987; Eckbo, Giammarino, Heinkel,
1990; Gorbenko and Malenko, 2017). Our analysis shows that the identity
of the winning bidder—and thus its characteristics—are an outcome of the
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entry process itself. In our structural framework, these ex post variables,
such as cash payment, the initiator of a deal, or the relative size of the tar-
get and acquirer, lose their predictive ability once we condition on the other
observables that enter our analysis.19
More generally, by using a structural model to directly quantify pre-entry
uncertainty and its effects on the relative performance of auctions and negoti-
ations, we build on earlier work that found similar shareholder returns across
auctions and negotiations in the aggregate, but that did not empirically char-
acterize cross-sectional variation in information frictions or show how they
influence the relative optimality of auctions and negotiations for individual
targets, as we do here. At the same time, our finding of large variation in
pre-entry uncertainty across targets, only some of which is predicted by ex
ante target characteristics, invites more research to verify whether certain
shareholder empowerment movements should press for more stringent inter-
pretation of statutes that could be construed as requiring that target boards
conduct auction-style processes (Bebchuck, 1982; Revlon v. McAndrews and
Forbes Holdings, 1986; Cramton and Schwartz, 1991).
Indeed, our structural estimates, identified based on information about
entry patterns and bids, reveals significant cross-sectional variation across
targets in takeover market primitives and in the relative performance of auc-
tions and negotiations. At the same time, results reported in this section
reveal that some portion of this total variation is explained by ex ante ob-
servable target characteristics, thus opening the door to further research that
might explore alternate pathways to systematically predicting optimal sale
procedures based on information that might be available to researchers before
a sale process is initiated.
7. Robustness
19To show this, we regressed the model-predicted target-specific relative returns to auc-
tions on three ex post deal outcomes: a dummy variable for whether the winning bidder
paid in cash, a dummy variable for whether the deal was a tender offer, a dummy variable
for whether the deal was unsolicited, and the relative size of the winning bidder and target.
Three of the four variables are highly statistically significant in this regression, but the
explanatory power of all four ex post variables vanishes when we control for the ex ante
observable target characteristics from Table 8. This finding echoes other structural studies
of takeover auctions that caution against the use of simple associations between observed
deal outcomes and such variables without characterizing the endogenous behavior of actors
whose behavior leads a researcher to observe them in the first place.
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In this section, we provide several checks on our findings. First, we check
to see whether the model performs well at predicting takeover auction pat-
terns. The model predicts that the average number of invited bidders that
choose to enter is 5.33, similar to the corresponding figure of 5.84 in Table
2. The model predicts that takeover revenue is 41.18% on average, similar
to the 42.8% average revenue in our sample, shown in Table 2. The model
thus performs reasonably well at predicting entry patterns and winning bids
in takeover auctions.
Second, we check the sensitivity of our results to the format of the bidding
game. Here, we assume that a subset of entering bidders with values above
the target’s reservation value compete in a first-price auction for the target.20
Specifically, bidding among entering bidders starts from a seller-announced
initial adequate price v0 and proceeds via an ascending auction until the
auction reaches a price p ≥ v0 at which at most k bidders remain. Note
that our baseline ascending auction obtains when k = 1. From this point,
the remaining bidders compete in a first-price sealed bid auction with the
highest bidder in this final round winning the target and paying its bid.
However, the form of the bidding equilibrium will change, and this could
in principle influence our interpretation of the data. Details on the bidding
equilibrium are provided in the online internet appendix. The estimates are
reported in Column 1 (for k = 2) and Column 2 (for k = 3) of online internet
appendix Table A.1. The estimates are similar to the main estimates in Table
3.
Third, we examine the model’s sensitivity to the assumption that poten-
tial bidders know Nj when deciding whether to participate in an auction.
This assumption was approximated by the view that potential bidders or
their advisors use knowledge about the target and its industry to assess the
size of the potential bidder pool. We implement one such approximation in
which each potential bidder’s belief is based on a forecast of Nj based on
target observables, which we construct using the predicted value from OLS
regressions of Nj on the vector Xj.
21 Estimates obtained using this predicted
20Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) implement a technique developed by Haile and Tamer
(2003) that allows them to estimate parameters in an ascending auction model without
committing to a specific bidding format. Our focus on endogenous entry necessitates the
use of a general model of entry behavior in which parameters cannot be recovered using
the Haile and Tamer (2003) technique.
21This procedure is intentionally based on the crude assumption that the only informa-
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value, reported in Column 3 of the online internet appendix Table A.1, are
similar to the baseline estimates in Table 3.
Fourth, we re-estimate all parameters under alternative assumptions on
the target’s reservation value v0. Specifically, we assume that v0 is drawn from
an exponential distribution with target-specific mean µ0j, with µ0j drawn in-
dependently from a Gamma distribution with mean and variance estimated
by empirical model. Estimates obtained using this model are reported in
Column 4 of the online internet appendix Table A.1. While these estimates
are similar to the baseline estimates in Table 3, they imply a price distribu-
tion with a mean sale premium of 47.03%, which departs substantially more
from both the data (42.80%) and the estimates implied by our baseline re-
serve specification (41.18%). This finding both bolsters confidence that our
results are not driven by modeling assumptions about the unobserved target
reservation value and underscores our empirical preference for the baseline
model.
Fifth, we check the sensitivity of our results to the sample restriction that
excludes deals with winning bids below the target’s share price four weeks
prior to announcement. The results, reported in Column 5 of the online
internet appendix Table A.1, are similar to the baseline estimates reported
in Table 3.
8. Concluding remarks
A large and well-composed pool of entering bidders creates competition
and high takeover prices, yet in practice fewer than half of invited bidders
choose to participate in takeover auctions. This paper estimates an empirical
structural model that characterizes this endogenous entry, thus permitting
tion available to a potential bidder are the Xj and information about Nj from previous
deals. To see how such possible uncertainty maps into model parameters, consider a hypo-
thetical increase in a potential bidder’s uncertainty about the number of invited potential
bidders. Conditional on a given signal, uncertainty in Nj maps into uncertainty about the
number of competing entrants, and thus about expected post-entry profits. Hence, all else
equal, an increase in uncertainty about Nj will tend to appear in the model as an increase
in α. Since in practice potential bidders and their advisers have access to information
about the target not contained in Xj , this procedure provides a plausible lower bound on
potential bidder’s degree of knowledge about Nj . Since they are constructed based on the
assumption that potential bidders have access to very little information about the target,
the estimate α reported in online internet appendix Table A.1 can be interpreted as an
upper bound on average pre-entry uncertainty.
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recovery of takeover market characteristics that determine whether auctions
or negotiations yield higher prices for individual target firms. The estimates
reveal that potential bidders’ pre-entry uncertainty is a quantitatively im-
portant feature of takeover markets, with pre-entry beliefs containing more
noise than information on average. At the same time, our analysis reveals
that pre-entry uncertainty varies dramatically across takeover markets, while
also differently affecting auctions and negotiations. Contrary to what some
scholars have proposed, information frictions can enhance the performance
of auctions, even while reducing a target’s bargaining power in negotiated
transactions. Together, our findings imply that negotiations perform rela-
tively well in takeover markets with low information frictions.
Our analysis also uncovers associations between pre-entry uncertainty and
firm-level variables such as size and cash holdings. Future research might
extend this line of exploration by investigating how and to what extent in-
formation frictions, endogenous entry patterns, and the relative performance
of auctions and negotiations can be explained by firm- and market-level char-
acteristics observable to researchers before a sale process begins.
Our study has compared takeover revenue resulting from a target’s sale
by auction with revenue from the same target’s decision to be sold by a nego-
tiated transaction. In doing so, our analysis places auctions and negotiations
on an even playing field. An alternate line of argument in the debate about
how firms should be sold hypothesizes the possible existence of non-price
procedure-specific costs or benefits, for example, a target board’s desire to
quickly sell the company. Such hypothesized costs and benefits might cause a
sale procedure to be preferred even if it produces lower expected revenue. To
date, these lines of argument lack systematic evidence about the quantitative
magnitudes of such possible intangible costs and benefits, a fact implying that
any sale procedure might in principle be justified ex post by making recourse
to the possible existence of such sale-specific features. Future research might
thus add such non-price frictions posited in corporate finance literature to
our model, for example, a cost of delay (e.g., Subramanian, 2008), or a cost
of approaching additional bidders (e.g., Hansen, 2001). In the same sense
that we have integrated the size, composition, and deterrence effects into a
single structural model of endogenous participation, quantifying the relative
magnitudes of these channels on an even playing field, future research might
incorporate additional frictions, thus permitting their relative magnitudes to
be quantified and directly compared with the effects studied here.
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Appendix
A. Entry Equilibrium
First, we formally obtain an expression for a particular bidder’s expected
profits conditional on entry. All variables are sale specific, so in this sec-
tion we suppress both j subscripts and the target-level primitives θj to ease
exposition. All derivations below should be interpreted as conditional on a
particular realization of target-level primitives θj.
Let s∗N denote the equilibrium threshold characterizing entry behavior
among the N potential bidders for target j, F ∗ (·|N) ≡ F (·|Si ≥ s∗N) be
the c.d.f. characterizing the selected distribution of valuations for each of
the n bidders electing to enter, and F0(·) be the distribution of the target’s
reservation value V0. Let Yk:n denote the kth highest valuation among n
entering bidders, let yk:n denote the realization of this random variable, and
let v0 denote the realization of the target’s reservation value V0. If y1:n ≥ v0,
the target is sold at p = max{y2:n, v0} so conditional on realizations of all
random variables, the surplus of bidder with valuation vi is thus
1[vi ≥ max{y1:n−1, v0}] (vi − p) (A.1)
= 1[vi ≥ max{y1:n−1, v0}] (vi −max{y1:n−1, v0}) .
Let H∗n(·|N) be the equilibrium CDF of the random variable max{Y1:n−1, V0}˙:
H∗n(y|N) = F0(y) · F ∗(y|N)n−1. (A.2)
By definition, H∗n(v|N) is the probability that a bidder with valuation v is
the final standing bidder, with the associated density
h∗n(v|N) = f0(v) · F ∗(v|N)n−1 + (n− 1)F0(v)F ∗(v|N)n−1f ∗(v|N), (A.3)
describing the distribution of the bidder’s outside option in this case, so the
expected profit of an entrant with valuation vi is thus
pi∗(vi;n,N) = H∗n(vi|N)
∫ vi
0
(vi − y) · h
∗
n(y|N)
H∗n(y|N)
dy (A.4)
=
[
viH
∗
n(vi|N)−
∫ vi
0
y h∗n(y|N) dy
]
=
∫ vi
0
F0(y) · F ∗(y|N)n−1 dy,
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where the last equality follows from integration by parts.
Having obtained an expression for an entering bidder’s expected profits,
we now characterize the symmetric monotone pure strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. In any such equilibrium, entry decisions can be characterized
by a signal threshold s∗N such that bidder i chooses to enter if and only if
Si ≥ s∗N :
F ∗(v; s∗N ) = F (v|Si ≥ s∗N ) =
1
1− Fs(s∗N )
∫ ∞
s∗N
F (v|t) fs(t) dt, (A.5)
The CDF of the distributions of valuations among entrants is then F ∗(v|N) =
F ∗(v; s∗N). The following identity will be useful: for any (v, s
∗),
(1− Fs(s∗))F ∗(v; s∗) =
∫ ∞
s∗
F (v|t) fs(t) dt = Fv(v)− Fvs(v, s∗). (A.6)
Independence of signals implies that the total number of entrants n follows
a binomial distribution based on the entry probability [1 − Fs(s∗N)]. Now
consider the entry decision of potential acquirer i drawing signal realization
Si = si. Conditional on own signal si, the equilibrium threshold s
∗
N , and total
competition N , a potential bidder forecasts profits Π(si; s
∗
N , N). Expanding
this term yields,
= EV [En[pi
∗(vi;n,N)|n ≥ 1]|Si = si] (A.7)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ v
0
F0(y)
[
N∑
n=1
(
N − 1
n− 1
)
Fs(s
∗
N)
N−n ([1− Fs(s∗N)]F ∗(y; s∗N ))n−1
]
dy dF (v|si)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ v
0
[
F0(y) [Fs(s
∗
N) + (1− Fs(s∗N))F ∗(y; s∗N )]N−1
]
dy dF (v|si)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ v
0
[
F0(y) [Fs(s
∗
N) + Fv(y)− F (y, s∗N)]N−1
]
dy dF (v|si),
where the third equality follows by properties of binomial series.
Reversing the order of integration yields our main expression for ex ante
expected profit for potential acquirer with Stage 1 signal Si = si:
Π(si; s
∗
N , N) =
∫ ∞
0
[1− F (v|si)] · F0(y) · [Fs(s∗N) + Fv(y)− F (y, s∗N)]N−1 dy.
(A.8)
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F (v|si) is decreasing in si by stochastic dominance, and Fs(s∗N) + Fv(y) −
F (y, s∗N) is increasing in s
∗
N by the identity
Fs(s
∗
N) + Fv(y)− F (y, s∗N) = Fs(s∗N) +
∫ s¯
s∗
F (v|t) fs(t) dt (A.9)
and it is easy to show that Fs(s
∗
N) + Fv(y)− F (y, s∗N) ∈ [0, 1] .
We now characterize equilibrium entry decisions. Bidder i enters into
competitive bidding if expected profit from doing so is positive, so the equi-
librium threshold s∗N must thus satisfy the break even condition:
Π(s∗N ; s
∗
N , N)− c = 0. (A.10)
In other words, a marginal potential bidder with signal Si = s
∗
N must be
indifferent between entering and not entering. Π(si; s
∗
N , N) is increasing in its
first argument and is strictly increasing in its second argument, so the break
even condition (A.10) has a unique solution s∗N . Further, since Π(si; s
∗
N , N)
is decreasing in N , this solution s∗N is increasing in N . Finally, by the form of
the entry decision rule, the distribution of valuations among entering bidders
is F ∗(v; s∗N) = F (v|Si ≥ s∗) . The signal threshold s∗N is thus sufficient to
characterize equilibrium entry behavior.
B. Estimation Algorithm
Recall the objective of our structural estimation procedure: to recover
the deep structural parameters Γ0 governing the distribution g(θ|Xj,Γ0) of
the target-level characteristics θj, accounting for the facts that (1) individual
realizations of θj are unobserved to the econometrician, and (2) we observe
only auctions resulting in sale. Toward this end, we consider maximum
likelihood estimation based on events of the following form: for a given target
j, nj of bidders enter and the final sale price is Pj = pj, conditional on target
j inviting Nj potential bidders and holding an auction which results in sale.
Integrating over unobserved target-level characteristics θj, we thereby obtain
a target-level structural conditional likelihood function (in Γ) of the form:
Lj(pj, nj|salej = 1, Nj, Xj; Γ) =∫
fp(pj|salej, nj, Nj; θj) · Pr(salej|nj, Nj; θj) · Pr(nj|Nj; θj) g(θj|Xj,Γ) dθj/∫
Pr(salej|nj, Nj; θj) · Pr(nj|Nj; θj) g(θj|Xj,Γ) dθj, (6)
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In describing our procedure for estimating Γ based on equation (6), we pro-
ceed in four steps. First, we describe how we solve for the equilibrium entry
threshold s∗(Nj, θj), which is the key prediction of the structural entry and
bidding model above. Second, we discuss computation of the equilibrium
objects Pr(nt|Nt; θj), Pr(salet|Nt; θj), and fp(pt|salet, nt, Nt; θj) appearing
in (6). Third, we describe the importance sampling procedure by which we
evaluate the integrals over θj appearing in the numerator and denominator of
(6). Finally, we discuss the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm by which
we maximize (6) to recover point estimates and confidence intervals for Γˆ.
B.1. Solving for the equilibrium entry threshold
Consider a takeover auction among Nj potential bidders competing for a
target j with characteristics θj (observed to bidders, but unobserved to us).
Let s∗(Nj; θj) denote the signal threshold characterizing equilibrium entry
behavior in this takeover environment. From Equation (A.10), we know that
we may compute this threshold s∗(Nj; θj) as the unique solution s∗ to the
breakeven condition:
c(θj) =
∫ ∞
0
[1− Fv|s(y|s∗; θj)] · F0(y; θj) ·HNj(y; θj)dy, (B.1)
where HNj(·; s∗, θj) denotes the expected c.d.f. of the maximum valuation
realized (through entry) among the Nj − 1 potential rivals of each bidder i,
accounting for the fact that some of these rivals may not enter in equilibrium:
HNj(y; s
∗, θj) ≡ [Fs(s∗; θj) + Fv(y; θj)− Fvs(y, s∗; θj)]Nj−1 .
Taking θj ≡ (µvj, σ2vj, cj, αj) as given, (Vj, Sj) are jointly log-normal with
mean vector [µvj, µvj] and variance-covariance matrix
Var
([
Vj
Sj
])
=
[
σ2vj σ
2
vj
σ2vj
σ2vj
1−αj
]
.
Meanwhile, the conditional distribution of Vj given Sj = s
∗ is normal with
mean αjµvj + (1− αj)s∗ and variance αjσ2vj. Given θj, computation of both
HNj(y; s
∗; θj) and Fv|s(y|s∗) is therefore straightforward. For given θj and
Nj, we may therefore solve (B.1) numerically to obtain the equilibrium entry
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threshold s∗(Nj; θj). In practice, we approximate this solution by interpola-
tion over a fine grid in log s∗, computing the right-hand side integral by the
trapezoidal rule over a fine grid in log v.22
B.2. Computing equilibrium objects in the likelihood function
With the equilibrium entry threshold s∗(Nj; θj) in hand, we turn to
computation of the equilibrium objects Pr(nt|Nt; θj), Pr(salet|Nt; θj), and
fp(pt|salet, nt, Nt; θj) appearing in (6).
Toward this end, first consider Pr(nt|Nt; θj). By construction, potential
acquirers drawing signals Sij ≥ s∗(Nj, θj) elect to enter in equilibrium. The
probability that any given potential acquirer elects to enter is therefore
q(Nj, θj) = 1− Fs(s∗(Nj, θj); θj). (B.2)
Furthermore, conditional on θj, signal draws are independent across potential
aquirers. Taking Nj and θj as given, the distribution of nj therefore follows
a binomial distribution with success probability q(Nj, θj):
Pr(nj|Nj, θj) =
(
Nj
nj
)
q(Nj, θj)
nj(1− q(Nj, θj))Nj−nj . (B.3)
Next consider Pr(salej|Nj; θj). By construction, the auction for target j
ends in sale whenever at least one entering bidder draws a valuation above
the seller’s reservation value V0j. It follows that:
Pr(salej|Nj; θj) = Pr(V0j ≤ Y1:Nj |Nj, θj) = 1− Pr(Y1:Nj ≤ V0j|Nj, θj)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
[Fs(Nj; θj) + Fv(v0; θj)− Fvs(v0, s∗(Nj, θj); θj)]Nj f0(v0, θj) dv0,
(B.4)
where (as above) the term in brackets represents the probability that po-
tential acquirer i either does not enter or enters but draws a valuation less
than v0. As above, taking Nj and θj as given, the right-hand side integral is
straightforward to compute, yielding a numeric solution for Pr(salej|Nj; θj).23
22In practice, we consider grids of 200 points in both log s and log v, with grid support
between the 10−6th and (1− 10−6)th quantiles of logS and log V . Numerical simulations
confirm that the resulting solution is quite accurate in practice.
23In practice, as in computing s∗(Nj ; θj) above, we approximate this integral via the
trapezoidal rule on a grid of 200 points in log v0, with grid points spaced evenly (in log v0)
between the 10−6th and (1− 10−6)th quantiles of log V0.
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Finally, consider the density fp(pj|salej, nj, Nj; θj); i.e. the distribution
of the sale premium pj when target characteristics are θj, nj of Nj potential
bidders enter, and the auction results in sale. In characterizing this distribu-
tion, we adopt the following convention: through expressions such as
Pr(salej ∩ Pj = p|nj, Nj; θj) (B.5)
we intend to indicate to the mixed joint density of the discrete random vari-
able salej and the continuous random variable Pj; i.e. more precisely,
Pr(salej ∩ Pj = p|nj, Nj; θj) := lim
h↓0
Pr(salej ∩ Pj ∈ [p, p+ h]|nj, Nj; θj)
h
.
(B.6)
Applying this convention, we have by construction:
fp(pj|salej, nj, Nj; θj) = Pr(salej ∩ Pj = pj|nj, Nj; θj)
Pr(salej|nj, Nj; θj) . (B.7)
Pr(salej|nj, Nj; θj) was characterized above, so having obtained an expres-
sion for Pr(salej ∩ Pj = pj|nj, Nj; θj) the argument will be complete.
By construction, a sale occurs when at least one entrant draws a valuation
above the seller’s reservation value v0j. If only one entrant draws a valuation
above v0j, the transaction price pj is the seller’s reservation valuation v0j. If
at least two entrants draw valuations above v0j, the transaction price pj is
the second highest entrant valuation y2:nj . Decomposing likelihoods of these
events using properties of order statistics yields the overall mixed density
Pr (salej ∩ Pj = pj|nj, N j; θj)
= Pr (salej∩Y 2:nj= pj|nj, N j, θj)+ Pr (salej∩V 0j= pj|nj, N j, θj)
= Pr (Y 1:nj≥ pj∩Y 2:nj= pj∩V 0j≤ pj|nj, N j, θj)
+ Pr (Y 1:nj≥ pj∩Y 2:nj≤ pj∩V 0j= pj|nj, N j, θj)
=
[
nj(nj−1)F ∗(pj;N j, θj)nj−2[1− F ∗(pj;N j, θj)]f ∗(pj;N j, θj)
]
·F 0(p; θj)
+
[
njF
∗(pj;N j, θj)
nj−1[1− F ∗(pj;N j, θj)]
]
·f 0(pj; θj).
where as above F ∗(v|Nj, θj) denotes the equilibrium distribution of valua-
tions among entrants at (Nj, θj):
F ∗(v|Nj, θj) = F (v|Si ≥ s∗(Nj, θj)) = Fv(v; θj)− Fvs(v, s
∗(Nj, θj); θj)
1− Fs(s∗(Nj; θj); θj)
(B.8)
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Again, taking θj and s
∗(Nj; θj) as given, the distribution (B.8) can easily
be computed as above. Having solved for the equilibrium entry threshold
s∗(Nj; θj), computation of the equilibrium objects Pr(nt|Nt; θj), Pr(salet|Nt; θj),
and fp(pt|salet, nt, Nt; θj) for given Nj, θj thus becomes a reasonably straight-
forward numerical exercise.
B.3. Importance sampling approach to integration over θj
Give numeric expressions for the equilibrium objects Pr(pj, salej|nj, Nj; θ),
Pr(nj|Nj, θ), and Pr(salej|Nj; θ) obtained as above, we can in principle eval-
uate the likelihood (6) directly by computing the numerator and denominator
integrals ∫
Pr(pj, salej|nj, Nj; θ) Pr(nj|Nj, θ) g(θ|Xj,Γ) dθ (B.9)
and ∫
Pr(salej|Nj; θ) g(θ|Xj,Γ) dθ. (B.10)
Direct evaluation of the likelihood function is computationally prohibitive in
practice since (B.9) and (B.10) depend on θ through the equilibrium condi-
tion (B.1), which itself requires solution of an equation involving integrals.
We circumvent this challenge by implementing estimation via the simulated
likelihood method of Ackerberg (2009)24, which uses the principle of impor-
tance sampling to transform the complicated problem of repeated evaluation
of the full likelihood into the much simpler problem of repeated evaluation
of g(θ|Xj,Γ).
To illustrate the main idea of this method, let g˜(·) be any fixed proposal
distribution over θ, and consider evaluation of the sale-level likelihood integral
(B.9). By standard importance sampling arguments, we can rewrite this
integral as follows:∫
Pr(pj, salej|nj, Nj; θ) Pr(nj|Nj, θ) g(θ|Xj,Γ) dθ (B.11)
=
∫ [
Pr(pj, salej|nj, Nj; θ) Pr(nj|Nj, θ) g(θ|Xj,Γ)
g˜(θ)
]
g˜(θ) dθ
= E˜
[
Pr(pj, salej|nj, Nj; θ) Pr(nj|Nj, θ) g(θ|Xj,Γ)
g˜(θ)
]
,
24Ackerberg, D., 2009. A new use of importance sampling to reduce computational
burden in simulation estimation, Quantitative Marketing and Economics 7, 343-376.
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where the expectation in the last line is taken with respect to the proposal
distribution g˜(·) rather than the true distribution g(·|Xj,Γ). If
{
θ˜r
}R
r=1
is
a random sample drawn from g˜(·), it follows that for large enough R∫
Pr (pj,salej|nj, N j; θ) Pr (nj|N j, θ) g(θ|Xj,Γ) dθ (B.12)
≈
R∑
r=1
Pr (pj,salej|nj, N j; θr) Pr (nj|N j, θr)
g(θr|Xj,Γ)
g˜(θr)
.
If a new sample
{
θ˜r
}R
r=1
is drawn each time the integral (B.9) is evaluated,
this importance sampling procedure will of course do nothing to simplify
computation. Note, however, that the parameters Γ now appear only in
the distribution g(θr|Xj,Γ) , which itself only affects weights on elements
in a sum. This in turn motivates Ackerberg (2009)’s reinterpretation of
importance sampling.
Specifically, rather than drawing {θ˜r}Rr=1 anew each time (B.9) is evalu-
ated, Ackerberg (2009) propose to draw a single large sample {θ˜r}Rr=1 from
g˜(·) at the beginning of the algorithm. Holding this sample {θ˜r}Rr=1 fixed, we
may then calculate the integrand elements Pr(pj, salej|nj, Nj; θr), Pr(nj|Nj, θr),
and Pr(salej|Nj; θr) for each θr once for all prior to estimation. Holding
these pre-computed objects fixed, computation of the importance-sampling
approximation (B.12) to the integral (C.1) at different values of Γ requires
only recalculation of the importance sampling weights g(θj|Xj,Γ). As costs of
computing g(θr|Xj,Γ) are trivial relative to costs of recomputing equilibrium,
this allows for vastly accelerated estimation even net of higher setup costs,
with the added advantage that the simulated likelihood function is automat-
ically smooth in Γ. For our purposes, therefore, Ackerberg (2009) simulation
is ideal; it mitigates the computational infeasibility that otherwise would be
entailed by accommodating sample selection unobserved heterogeneity.
In practice, we implement this importance sampling procedure in two
steps as follows. As a first pass, we draw a candidate importance sample
{θr}Rr=1 of size R = 10000 for each target j from a multivariate uniform
distribution over the following intervals: for µrvj ∼ U [−0.5192, 1.1825] (cor-
responding to 4 standard deviations of price above and below the mean),
σrvj ∼ 10−6 + U [0, 0.5], crj ∼ U [0, 0.1], and αrj ∼ U [0, 1]. We then maximize
the log-likelihood to obtain a first-step estimate Γˆ0 for Γ0, and re-draw a new
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importance sample {θr}Rr=1 (also of size 10,000) for each auction j from the
resulting predicted distribution g(·|Xj, Γˆ0). Finally, we maximize the simu-
lated likelihood implied by this more accurate importance sample to obtain
our final estimator Γˆ for Γ0.
B.4. Inference: Pseudeo-Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo Algorithm
In view of the importance sampling algorithm above, a variety of algo-
rithms are feasible to maximize the (simulated analogue to) the log-likelihood
(6). In practice, however, we focus on a Markov Chain Monte Carlo proce-
dure in the spirit of Chernozhukov and Hong (2003).25 Specifically, starting
from a given initial point Γ0, we use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
algorithm to obtain a sample {Γk}Kk=1 of parameters from the conditional
likelihood
∏
j L(pj, nj|salej, Nj, Xj; ·), interpreted as (proportional to) the
Bayesian posterior over Γ induced by the observed sample {(pj, nj|Nj)}Jj=1
in conjunction with a flat (uninformative irregular) prior over Γ. We then
consider the resulting posterior sample {Γk}Kk=1 as a basis for inference on
Γ0.
While not strictly necessary, this pseudo-Bayesian MCMC approach has
several practical advantages. First, MCMC is a global maximization algo-
rithm, which will eventually trace out the entire posterior of Γ (i.e. the
entire likelihood function) from any initial point Γ0. Second, under classical
maximum likelihood regularity conditions, the Bernstein-Von Mises Theo-
rem implies that (for any prior) any of the mean, median, and mode of
{Γk}Kk=1 will be asymptotically equivalent to the classical maximum likeli-
hood estimator Γˆ, with consistent classical standard errors provided by the
standard deviation of {Γk}Kk=1.26 Third, even when classical maximum likeli-
hood regularity conditions fail — for instance, in models which are only set,
not point, identified — the posterior distribution traced out by the MCMC
sample {Γk}Kk=1 will still permit exact finite-sample Bayesian inference on Γ0,
leveraging only the information on Γ0 revealed by the data. Finally, given
the posterior sample {Γk}Kk=1, conducting inference on any function f(Γ) of
Γ0 is also straightforward — one need simply compute relevant quantiles of
f(Γk) over a (subsample of) k = 1, ..., K.
25Chernozhukov, V. and H. Hong, 2003. “An MCMC approach to classical estimation,”
Journal of Econometrics 115:2, 293-346.
26See, e.g., Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) for one discussion of this property.
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In practice, we implement MCMC at each iteration using a block Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm, with four parameter blocks corresponding to the param-
eters governing the distributions of µvj, σvj, cj, and αj, and a multivariate
normal proposal distribution for each block. We begin with a burnin phase
of K = 20, 000 iterations, using acceptance-rejection probabilities over this
burnin phase to tune the proposal variances for each of our four parameter
blocks. We then run another K = 60, 000 MCMC iterations, taking the re-
sulting posterior sample {Γk}60,000k=1 as a basis for inference on Γ0 as described
above. The resulting MCMC appears to have good mixing properties, con-
verging quickly (within 5000 burnin iterations) to the neighborhood of the
maximum likelihood even for relatively high-dimensional Γ. The high num-
bers of burnin and regular iterations above therefore primarily reflect an
abundance of caution – in practice, much shorter chain lengths give virtually
identical results.
C. The Negotiation Mechanisms
As described above, our counterfactual experiment of primary interest
concerns an N -round sequential negotiation mechanism. This mechanism
proceeds as follows. Round n = 1, ..., N begins when the target approaches
potential buyer i = 1, ..., N (ordered at random) with an invitation to par-
ticipate. The following events then take place in round n:
1. Potential buyer i observes its private signal Sij for the target. Based
on this signal Sij and the entry and bidding history up to round n− 1,
potential bidder i determines whether to enter the negotiation at cost
c.
2. Conditional on choosing to enter, potential buyer i learns its valuation
Vij. If another negotiating bidder has previously entered, potential
buyer i and the current incumbent compete in an ascending button
auction for the right to remain in the auction. The loser of this bidding
round exits and the winner becomes the incumbent, with the current
standing price being the level at which the loser drops out.
3. Conditional on outbidding the current incumbent, potential buyer i
may submit a bid above the current standing price. If submitted, this
jump bid is observed by all subsequent potential buyers, and becomes
the standing price in round n+ 1.
Let bn−1 be the standing bid at the beginning of round n, and yn−1 be the
valuation of the incumbent submitting bid bn−1. In view of the sequence of
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events above, these objects evolve as follows. Upon being contacted by the
acquirer in round n, potential acquirer i observes its signal sij and (based
on this plus the history of the game to date) decides whether to enter. If i
remains out in round n, the game proceeds to round n+ 1 with standing bid
bn = bn−1. Alternatively, if i elects to enter and draws valuation vij upon
entry, then three outcomes are possible. First, if vij is less than the current
standing bid bn−1, then i exits and the negotiation proceeds to round n + 1
with standing bid bn = bn−1. Second, if vij is greater than bn−1 but less than
yn−1, then i bids up the price to vij before exiting, and the negotiation pro-
ceeds to round n+ 1 with standing bid bn = vij. Finally, if vij is greater than
yn−1, then the current incumbent bids up the price to yn−1 before exiting,
and i becomes the new incumbent. To signal strength and thereby deter
future entry, incumbent i may then submit a jump bid bn ≥ yn−1. This jump
bid bn then becomes the standing bid in round n+ 1.
In practice, we focus on the unique separating perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium within this sequential negotiation game. This equilibrium has two key
components. First, entry decisions by bidder i in round n = 1, ..., N are
described by a signal threshold s∗n(yn−1) such that potential buyer i enters if
and only if Sij ≥ s∗n(yn−1), where yn−1 denotes the valuation of the standing
bidder and s∗n(yn−1) is strictly increasing in yn−1. Second, conditional on
outbidding an incumbent with valuation yn−1 in round n < N , new incum-
bent i with valuation vij ≥ yn−1 submits a jump bid bn ≥ yn−1 described
by a symmetric monotone jump bidding strategy βn(vij, yn−1). A separating
perfect Bayesian equilibrium is therefore a collection of round-specific entry
threshold functions (s1(y0), ..., sN(yN−1) and round-specific bidding strategies
(β1(v, y0), ..., βN−1(v, yN−1)) such that all players are best-responding at each
information node. We characterize these strategies by backward induction
as follows.
First consider the deterrence bidding decision of a new incumbent in
round N . As the game concludes at the end of round N , a new incumbent
in round N has no incentive to submit a deterrence bid. Conditional on
knocking out an incumbent with standing valuation yN−1, a new entrant
drawing valuation v ≥ yN−1 therefore trivially submits bid bN = yN−1 for all
v ≥ yN−1. In this event the new incumbent earns ex post payoff v − yN−1.
Next consider the entry decision of the potential bidder contacted in round
N . By hypothesis, we are considering a separating equilibrium in which prior
new incumbents have played bidding strategies strictly monotone in their
valuations. Observing the history of the game to date, the potential entrant
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in round N will therefore infer the standing valuation yN−1 of the incumbent
at the end of round N − 1. Conditional on drawing signal realization Si = si
against an incumbent with standing valuation yN−1, potential entrant N
therefore expects post-entry profit
ΠN(si, yN−1) =
∫
(Vi − yN−1) dFv|sN (Vi|si). (C.1)
Potential entrant N will enter when expected profits exceed costs, i.e. when
Π∗N(s9, yN−1) ≥ cj. This breakeven condition in turn determines the breakeven
threshold sN(yN−1), which by arguments similar to those in Appendix A can
be shown to be a strictly monotone function of the current standing valuation
yN−1.
Now consider the deterrence bidding decision of a new incumbent in round
N − 1. Conditional on knocking out a prior incumbent with valuation yN−2,
a new incumbent i with valuation vi ≥ yN−2 faces the following tradeoff: by
submitting a higher bid, i may pretend to be a higher type and thereby deter
entry by a potential competitor in round N , but doing so will require i to
pay a higher cost conditional on winning in this event. Specifically, if rivals
expect i to bid according to the strategy βN−1(·, yN−2), and entry decisions
by i’s potential round-N rival are taken according to the threshold sN(·)
above, then we may write i’s deterrence bidding problem as
max
z≥yN−2
piN(vi, z; βN−1(z, yN−2)) (C.2)
where piN(vi, z; bN−1) denotes the expected profit, at the start of round N
with standing bid bN−1, of an incumbent with true valuation vi but whom
potential rivals believe to have valuation z:
piN(vi, z; bN−1) = sN(z) · (vi − bN−1)
+ (1− sN(z))
∫ vi
0
(vi −max{YN , bN−1})dF (YN |SN ≥ sN(z)). (C.3)
Note that the first term of piN(vi, bN−1; z) reflects i’s profit from events in
which round N entry is successfully deterred, whereas the second term rep-
resents i’s expected profit in events where i’s round-N rival enters but draws
a valuation below vi.
Taking a first-order condition of (C.2) with respect to i’s type report z,
we obtain:
∂
∂bN−1
piN(vi, z; βN−1(z; yN−2)) ·β′(z, yN−2)+
∂
∂z
piN(vi, z; βN−1(z; yN−2)) = 0.
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Enforcing the restriction that in equilibrium the strategy βN−1(·, yN−2) must
be such that it is optimal for i to report truthfully, this in turn implies the
following differential equation characterizing the unknown deterrence bidding
strategy βN−1(·; yn−2):
β′(vi; yN−2) = −
∂
∂z
piN(vi, vi; βN−1(vi; yN−2))
∂
∂bN−1
piN(vi, vi; βN−1(vi; yN−2))
. (C.4)
Combined with the boundary condition β(yN−2; yN−2) = yN−2, this in turn
determines the function β(·; yN−2) describing equilibrium deterrence bidding
in round N − 1.
It is straightforward to show that, for given vi, round-N profit piN(vi, bN−1; z)
is strictly decreasing in bN−1 given z and strictly increasing in z given bN−1.
In other words, for given rival beliefs, i always prefers a strictly lower stand-
ing bid, and for a given standing bid, i always prefers rivals to believe she
is a stronger type. Hence β′(vi; yN−2) > 0 above, which implies that the
equilibrium deterrence bidding function β(·; yN−2) is strictly increasing as
expected. This confirms that bidding in round N − 1 is consistent with a
strictly separating equilibrium, as desired.
Finally, consider the entry decision of potential bidder i with signal Si = si
in round N − 1, facing an incumbent with standing valuation yN−2. Condi-
tional on entry, the expected profit of this potential entrant will be equal to
the optimal round N profit piN(vi, vi; βN−1(vi; yN−2)) described above, inte-
grated over potential realizations Vi of vi such that Vi ≥ yN−2:
ΠN−1(si; yN−2) =
∫ ∞
yN−2
piN(Vi, Vi; βN−1(Vi; yN−2)) dFv|s(Vi|si). (C.5)
It is again straightforward to show that the right-hand integrand must be
increasing in Vi and decreasing in yN−2. In view of the fact that Vi is
stochastically increasing in si, this in turn implies that there will exist a
unique threshold function sN−2(yN2) such that i enters against an incumbent
with standing valuation yN−2 only if Si ≥ sN−2(yN2). We thereby obtain a
complete characterization of entry and bidding behavior in round N − 2.
Proceeding recursively in this fashion for rounds N − 3, N − 4, ..., 1, one
ultimately obtains the desired series of strictly increasing entry functions
s1(y0), ..., sN(yN−1) and strictly increasing bidding functions β1(vi; y0), ...,
βN−1(vi; yN−2) characterizing the unique symmetric separating perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the sequential negotiation game. Roberts and Sweeting (2013)
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furthermore show that the resulting separating equilibrium is the only perfect
Bayesian equilibrium to survive standard refinements (no weakly dominated
strategies, sequential equilibrium, and the D1 refinements of Cho and Sobel
(1990) and Ramey (1996)) on equilibria of the sequential negotiation game.
The go-shop mechanism is similar to the sequential negotiation but with
only a single round of deterrence bidding. Bidding starts at a standing bid
b0 equal to the target’s reservation valuation. The target approaches one
potential bidder i at random, who observes their signal realization si and
based on this and the standing bid b0 decides whether to enter. If bidder
i enters, i observes its valuation vi, and may submit a jump bid above b0,
which becomes the new standing bid b1. Otherwise, the standing bid remains
b1 = b0. The game then proceeds to a go-shop round, in which the target
contacts the other N − 1 bidders, who based on the history of the game and
their private signals decide whether or not to enter. If at least two bidders
ultimately enter with values above the standing bid b1, the game concludes
with an ascending auction to determine the winning bidder. Otherwise the
game concludes at the standing bid b1.
Equilibrium in the go-shop mechanism is similar to that in the sequential
mechanism, but simpler, since there is only one round of deterrence bidding.
As above, we look for a symmetric separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The N − 1 entrants in the final round observe the history of the game to
date, including the initial bid b0, whether a bidder entered in Round 1, and
the entrant’s jump bid b1 if one was submitted. Based on this, all potential
entrants infer the standing valuation upon entry, which we denote y1: either
y1 = v0 = b0 if the standing bid is the seller’s reservation price, or y1 equal to
the incumbent’s valuation if the incumbent submitted a jump bid. Entry by
all N−1 bidders contacted in the go-shop stage therefore proceeds according
to a threshold s∗(y1), determined by the condition that a go-shop entrant
drawing signal realization Si = s
∗(y1) must just break even from entry when
the standing value is y1 and the other go-shop entrants enter according to
the threshold s∗(y1):∫ ∞
y1
[Fs(s
∗(y1)) + Fv(v)− Fvs(v, s∗(y1))]N−2 dFv|s(v|Si = s∗(y1)). (C.6)
Now consider Round 1 deterrence bidding by the incumbent. We seek a
deterrence bidding strategy BI(v; b0) which (for v > b0) is strictly monotone
in the incumbent’s valuation v. As above, this strategy will be characterized
by the condition that the incumbent’s gains from pretending to be a higher
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type are just offset by the additional costs of a higher standing bid. Letting z
denote the incumbent’s pretended type, this yields the maximization problem
max
z
{
(v − βI(z; b0)) · [Fs(s∗(z)) + Fv(βI(z; b0))− Fvs(βI(z; b0), s∗(z))]N−1
+
∫ v
βI(z;b0)
(v − y) d
dy
[Fs(s
∗(z)) + Fv(y)− Fvs(y, s∗(z))]N−1 dy
}
, (C.7)
where the first term reflects incumbent profents in the event that the incum-
bent faces no rival entrant with a valuation above the go-shop standing bid
b1 = βI(z; b0), and the second reflects expected profits in the event that at
least one go-shop rival enters with a valuation above the chosen standing
bid βI(z; b0). Taking a first-order condition with respect to z and enforcing
the equilibrium condition v = z, we ultimately obtain a differential equation
characterizing the derivative B′I(v; b0) of BI(v; b0), which together with the
boundary condition BI(b0; b0) = b0 uniquely determines the equilibrium de-
terrence bidding strategy BI(·; b0). As above, it is straightforward to show
that this strategy BI(·; b0) must be strictly increasing, which confirms that
BI(·; b0) describes a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium as desired.
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Figure 1: Pre-entry uncertainty and the composition of the entering bidder pool. This
figure reports the probability that potential bidders with different valuations enter, relative
to an average bidder. Specifically, each line plots the probability of entry (relative to the
mean bidder) for a bidder whose value lies at the pth percentile of the potential bidder
valuation distribution. The probabilities are computed using the estimates obtained in
Section 5 and the method described in Section 3, for the sample of takeover auctions of
public targets announced between January 1, 2000 and January 1, 2010.
Figure 2: Pre-entry uncertainty and the size of the entering bidder pool. This figure
reports the proportion of invited bidders that participate, on average, for takeover markets
with different levels of pre-entry uncertainty. The estimates are obtained using median
fundamental takeover market primitives obtained in Section 5 using the method described
in Section 3, on the sample of takeover auctions of targets announced between January 1,
2000 and January 1, 2010.
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Figure 3: Deterrence bidding in takeover negotiations. This figure shows additional contri-
bution to deal premia from deterrence bidding, for different levels of pre-entry uncertainty.
The vertical axis measures deterrence bidding in takeover premia units, i.e., as a percent
of the target’s current share price. Formally, the deterrence effect is defined as the dif-
ference between actual sale revenue and counterfactual revenue that would have resulted
from sale by an auction among the set of bidders participating at any point in the negoti-
ation sequence, i.e., the maximum of the second-highest negotiating bidder’s valuation or
the target’s reservation price. The estimates are obtained using the structural model and
median fundamental takeover market primitives estimated from the sample of takeover
auctions of public targets announced between January 1, 2000 and January 1, 2010.
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Table 1
Sample descriptive statistics: summary of the sale process
This table summarizes descriptive statistics (number, means, and standard devi-
ations) of sale characteristics in 529 takeover auctions from January 1, 2000 to
January 1, 2010 for all auctions and across Fama and French (1997) industries.
The variable Contact reports the average number of contacted potential bidders.
The variable Confidential reports the average number of potential bidders that
participate in a takeover auction by signing a confidentiality agreement with the
target. The variable Winning Bid reports the average price paid by the winning
bidder, normalized by the target’s share price four weeks prior to the deal’s an-
nouncement. Standard errors appear in parentheses.
Number Contact Confidential Winning bid
All auctions 529 13.291 5.844 1.428
(19.374) (7.479) (0.339)
Consumer Nondurables 19 13.631 6.526 1.419
(14.330) (6.327) (0.278)
Consumer Durables 5 23.400 9.000 1.325
(29.065) (14.560) (0.320)
Manufacturing 26 24.384 11.115 1.483
(42.002) (18.313) (0.424)
Oil, Gas, and Coal 16 19.375 5.687 1.236
(20.806) (6.508) (0.123)
Chemicals, etc. 4 4.000 2.500 1.552
(2.160) (1.290) (0.366)
Business Equipment 159 12.773 4.339 1.501
(19.839) (5.348) (0.366)
Communications 13 10.230 7.076 1.443
(12.234) (8.097) (0.457)
Utilities 7 14.571 6.428 1.394
(9.519) (5.826) (0.276)
Wholesale, Retail 12 18.166 9.916 1.645
(17.486) (12.265) (0.529)
Healthcare, Medical, etc. 57 12.473 5.473 1.462
(16.546) (5.590) (0.338)
Finance 178 11.797 6.016 1.331
(15.421) (6.157) (0.242)
Other 33 12.121 6.181 1.517
(17.318) (7.699) (0.415)53
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Table 2
Target characteristics
This table reports descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for tar-
gets sold in 529 takeover auctions announced between January 1, 2000 and Jan-
uary 1, 2010 for the full sample and for each of the 12 Fama and French (1997)
industries. The table reports data on target assets measured as the book value
of total assets (current assets plus net property, plant, and equipment plus other
noncurrent assets), market leverage, q ratio (market-to-book), along with cash,
intangibles, and sales, with these latter three variables scaled relative to book
assets. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
Assets q Leverage Cash Intangibles Sales
All auctions 848.77 1.292 0.214 0.141 0.103 0.708
(1452.14) (1.647) (0.248) (0.176) (0.166) (0.797)
Nondurables 972.06 1.273 0.199 0.086 0.142 1.474
(1311.90) (0.882) (0.201) (0.147) (0.176) (0.818)
Durables 783.96 0.935 0.359 0.099 0.110 1.189
(1272.22) (0.430) (0.336) (0.100) (0.120) (0.680)
Manufacturing 708.54 1.357 0.150 0.105 0.122 1.261
(1669.53) (1.051) (0.163) (0.140) (0.162) (0.551)
Oil, Gas, and Coal 1490.39 1.146 0.338 0.050 0.015 0.704
(1689.33) (0.423) (0.177) (0.072) (0.027) (0.869)
Chemicals, etc. 287.71 1.001 0.165 0.053 0.040 2.195
(190.66) (0.103) (0.191) (0.061) (0.055) (1.587)
Business Equipment 350.44 1.713 0.062 0.246 0.162 0.846
(721.03) (2.263) (0.126) (0.183) (0.187) (0.441)
Communications 962.66 1.437 0.371 0.094 0.307 0.705
(973.00) (0.729) (0.287) (0.109) (0.227) (00.893)
Utilities 2504.67 0.934 0.377 0.013 0.087 1.439
(2533.90) (0.285) (0.126) (0.014) (0.142) (2.672)
Wholesale, Retail 638.49 1.903 0.152 0.109 0.099 2.596
(862.93) (2.767) (0.269) (0.143) (0.121) (1.493)
Healthcare 563.00 2.529 0.104 0.241 0.119 0.629
(1529.87) (1.756) (0.150) (0.210) (0.179) (0.454)
Finance 1350.21 0.465 0.365 0.039 0.020 0.195
(1734.26) (0.449) (0.264) (0.066) (0.062) (0.438)
Other 516.07 1.311 0.257 0.193 0.166 0.982
(1044.48) (0.779) (0.298) (0.237) (0.232) (0.634)54
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Table 3
Takeover market primitives
This table reports estimates of the takeover market primitives recovered by the
structural model described in Section 3, on the data described in Section 4. Panel
A reports parameter means across all targets in our sample, and medians in brack-
ets. The parameters of interest are the mean (µ) and variance (σ) of the poten-
tial entrant value distribution, average entry costs (c), and the average degree of
pre-entry uncertainty (α). Column 1 reports estimates from a specification that
employs a uniform proposal distribution without conditioning on target observ-
ables. The estimates in Columns 2-5 iterate once on the proposal distribution as
described in Appendix B. The estimates in Column 2 do not condition on target
observables. The estimates in Column 3 condition (µ) on the vector of target
observables. Estimates in Column 4 condition both (µ) and (α) on the vector of
target observables. Estimates in Column 5 condition all fundamental parameters
on target observables. Panel B reports characteristics of the distribution of model
parameters across takeover markets: the standard deviation and the 25th and 75th
percentiles of the estimated parameter distributions.
Panel A: Point estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-entry uncertainty (α) 0.6200 0.6260 0.6367 0.5830 0.6082
[0.6595] [0.6479] [0.6592] [0.6035] [0.6203]
Average entry cost (c) 0.0151 0.0109 0.0115 0.0091 0.0528
[0.0089] [0.0044] [0.0046] [0.0037] [0.0187]
Average potential bidder 0.2024 0.2818 0.2834 0.2841 0.2660
valuation (µ) [0.2026] [0.2819] [0.2832] [0.2840] [0.2662]
Spread of valuations 0.1539 0.0598 0.0593 0.0581 0.0753
across potential bidders (σ) [0.1261] [0.0543] [0.0544] [0.0524] [0.0558]
Panel B: Cross-sectional variation in takeover market parameters
α c µ σ
Standard deviation 0.1280 0.0121 0.2106 0.0330
25th Percentile 0.4010 0.0007 0.1308 0.0342
75th Percentile 0.7785 0.0113 0.4376 0.0753
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Table 4
Estimates of partial effects
This table reports average marginal effects for individual γ’s. The marginal effects
are constructed by holding X constant at the median and drawing a sample of
γ’s from the posterior (n=100). The marginal effect of X at γ is defined as the
average effect of either a unit change in X (for dummy variables) or a one standard
deviation change in X (for continuous variables) on the mean of θ. Standard errors
of the marginal effects are reported in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates.
a, b, and c denote statistical significance of individual coefficients at the 5
Median X Median X
Posterior γ Posterior γ
Variable µv α Variable µv α
Size -0.125a -0.032 Oil, Gas, Coal -0.094a -0.069a
(0.040) (0.038) (0.026) (0.023)
q -0.011 -0.039c Chemicals, etc. 0.018 -0.027a
(0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.013)
Leverage 0.054c 0.011 Business Equipment -0.004 -0.192a
(0.034) (0.026) (0.068) (0.041)
Cash 0.028 -0.013 Telephone & Television -0.013 0.010
(0.043) (0.024) (0.028) (0.018)
Intangibles -0.070a -0.004 Utilities -0.021 -0.032
(0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032)
Sales -0.046c -0.006 Wholesale/Retail 0.0318 -0.004
(0.037) (0.029) (0.037) (0.020)
Nondurables -0.013 0.0210 Healthcare -0.047 -0.063a
(0.037) (0.030) (0.048) (0.031)
Durables -0.034c 0.015 Finance -0.176a -0.078a
(0.026) (0.0364) (0.067) (0.036)
Other -0.011 -0.025
(0.044) (0.030)
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Table 5
Target characteristics and average pre-entry uncertainty
This table shows average pre-entry uncertainty in different subsamples, using the main
estimates from Column 4 of Table 3 and the model-implied weights. Panel A reports
target-level averages of pre-entry uncertainty for each industry, and pre-entry uncer-
tainty at the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the parameter distributions. Panel B sorts
target-level fundamental parameters into quantiles based on observable balance sheet
characteristics and reports the average level of pre-entry uncertainty across targets
within each size-observable quantile.
Panel A. Variation in pre-entry uncertainty (α) within and across industries
Industry Mean 2.5% 97.5% Industry Mean 2.5% 97.5%
Nondurables 0.87 0.46 0.99 Communication 0.79 0.33 0.99
Durables 0.84 0.24 1.00 Utilities 0.54 0.04 0.99
Manufacturing 0.80 0.43 0.99 Wholesale, Ret. 0.73 0.30 0.98
Oil, Gas, and Coal 0.35 0.03 0.78 Healthcare 0.58 0.19 0.93
Chemicals, etc. 0.50 0.07 0.94 Finance 0.67 0.29 0.94
Bus. Equipment 0.38 0.08 0.75 Other 0.70 0.29 0.98
Panel B: Quantile sorts of α on balance sheet characteristics
Cash Leverage
Low 2 3 4 High Low High
Small 0.72 0.77 0.59 0.57 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.58 0.64 0.74
2 0.74 0.64 0.58 0.50 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.63 0.66 0.66
3 0.65 0.69 0.67 0.47 0.41 0.50 0.53 0.61 0.64 0.68
4 0.61 0.66 0.60 0.51 0.41 0.52 0.51 0.55 0.61 0.65
Big 0.60 0.63 0.58 0.56 0.33 0.39 0.40 0.59 0.61 0.62
q Sales
Small 0.67 0.59 0.60 0.51 0.53 0.60 0.56 0.59 0.51 0.61
2 0.68 0.57 0.59 0.51 0.48 0.64 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.63
3 0.70 0.66 0.57 0.52 0.44 0.68 0.65 0.45 0.55 0.64
4 0.68 0.64 0.60 0.46 0.51 0.67 0.59 0.51 0.54 0.57
Big 0.64 0.63 0.53 0.63 0.49 0.64 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.72
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Table 6
Unconditional counterfactual estimates
This table reports means, medians, and standard deviations of expected revenue
accruing to target shareholders from auctions with endogenous entry, from one-
shot negotiations followed by a go-shop auction, and from sequential negotiations,
on a sample of takeover auctions announced between January 1, 2000 and January
1, 2010. The estimates are constructed using the structural model described in
Section 3 at median observable and unobservable characteristics (Median Γ) and
the resulting baseline fundamental parameter estimates.
Negotiation Sequential
Auction with go-shop negotiation
Expected revenue 41.17 41.48 42.61
Revenue S.D. 11.14 8.78 3.32
Revenue skewness -2.63 -2.84 -0.52
Surplus extracted if sale (pct.) 84.55 85.65 88.40
Highest value potential 76.20 70.77 63.95
bidder wins (pct.)
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This table reports the percent of expected deal revenue attributable to the size
effect, for different values of pre-entry uncertainty and entry costs. This size ef-
fect, defined in Section 6.2, is the difference between actual expected revenue and
counterfactual expected revenue where entering bidders were randomly selected
from the pool of potential bidders instead of self-selecting based on their pre-entry
beliefs. The counterfactual revenue is computed by taking as given the number of
actual entrants in an auction, and using the structural estimates to compute rev-
enue that would have resulted if the same number of entrants had been randomly
selected from the pool of potential bidders. The values reported in the table are
obtained by dividing the size effect by expected auction revenue. The estimates
are constructed using median observable and unobservable characteristics (Median
Γ) and the resulting baseline fundamental parameter estimates recovered using the
method described in Section 3.
Pre-entry uncertainty (α)
0.15 0.35 0.60 0.85 0.99
c = 0.005 93.47% 93.88% 94.6% 95.88% 99.99%
c = 0.010 92.97% 93.38% 94.15% 95.40% 97.22%
c = 0.030 92.62% 93.08% 93.89% 95.18% 97.03%
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Table 8
Auctions vs negotiations and target observables
This table shows differences in the relative performance of auctions and negotia-
tions among different subsets of targets. The counterfactual estimates are obtained
using the structural primitives recovered in Section 5 using the method described in
Section 3, on the data described in Section 4. We form a decile grid in each funda-
mental parameter, and for each possible combination of fundamental parameters
draw a heterogeneity vector from the posterior obtained in Section 5, applying
model weights to obtain estimates of fundamental takeover market parameters
that vary with target observables. The resulting target-level parameters are used
to calculate expected revenue differences across takeovers. We sort all targets in
our sample based on each characteristic and use the estimated model primitives to
compute the fraction of targets within each category for which expected auction
revenue is greater than expected revenue from a sequential negotiation.
Panel A: Industry patterns
Panel B: Balance sheet characteristics
Bottom quantile Top quantile Revenue difference
Characteristic of the Sample of the sample correlation
Assets 14.75% 19.18% -0.615
q 18.92% 12.19% 0.373
Leverage 13.34% 19.71% -0.378
Cash 19.12% 11.51% 0.667
Intangibles 16.32% 16.03% -0.019
Sales 18.16% 19.54% -0.055
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Figure 4: Negotiation revenue relative to auction. This figure reports the expected dif-
ference in takeover auction revenue between negotiations and auctions, as a function of
pre-entry uncertainty. The estimates are obtained using the structural estimates and
median fundamental takeover market primitives estimated from the sample of takeover
auctions of public targets announced between January 1, 2000 and January 1, 2010.
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Figure 5: Uncertainty, entry costs, and expected revenue. This figure reports a compar-
ison of revenue-maximizing sale mechanisms (auction versus sequential negotiation) for
different levels of uncertainty and entry costs. The estimates are constructed using me-
dian observable and unobservable characteristics and the resulting baseline fundamental
parameter estimates. Dark circles indicate takeover market parameters implying auctions
revenue-dominate sequential negotiations, and hexagrams indicate the opposite. Hollow
circles indicate situations where simulation error is larger than estimated revenue differ-
ences.
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